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Nearly twenty years ago, Congress officially extended copyright
protection to computer programs.1 Five years later, the Supreme Court

1
Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. '' 101,
102 & 117 (1988 & Supp. 1994)).
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issued a decision that definitively established computer programs'
eligibility for patent protection.2 The two developments had very
different trajectories; the debate over patent protection was long, hardfought, and occasionally acrimonious,3 while the extension of copyright
protection was accomplished by committee and consensus, almost as an
afterthought.4 The developments were similar in one respect, however.
Both Congress and the Supreme Court treated computer programs as
autonomous intellectual products, intended for use on a stand-alone
basis in the same manner as a copyrighted book or a patented industrial
apparatus.5 Today, in contrast, it is evident that the value of a computer
program to its users depends heavily on its compatibility, or
interoperability, with a particular computer system and with other
programs.6 Whether interoperability-related issues should affect
copyright and patent treatment of computer programs, and if so, how,
are among the decade's most hotly debated legal questions.7
For creators of computer programs, achieving interoperability with
particular computers and operating systems is necessary for commercial survival.8
Interoperability has also become a watchword for
consumers who seek applications programs that will operate on their

2

Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
For an exhaustive chronicle of this debate, see Pamela Samuelson, Benson Revisited:
The Case Against Patent Protection for Algorithms and Other Computer-Related Inventions,
39 EMORY L.J. 1025, 1032-99 (1990) [hereinafter Samuelson, Benson Revisited].
4
See H.R. REP . No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5664 (“[C]omputer programs, for exampleCcould be regarded as an
extension of copyrightable subject matter Congress had already intended to protect, and were
thus considered copyrightable from the outset without the need of new legislation.”); FINAL
REPORT OF THE NAT 'L COMM 'N ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS 12, 1516 (1978) [hereinafter CONTU, FINAL REPORT ].
5
See 17 U.S.C. ' 101 (1988) (defining “computer program” as “a set of statements or
instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain
result”); Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185-87 (describing program invention as a process in which “a
mathematical formula” and “a digital computer” are used).
6
See Dennis S. Karjala, Copyright Protection of Computer Documents, Reverse
Engineering, and Professor Miller, 19 U. DAYTON L. REV . 975, 990 (1994) [hereinafter
Karjala, Computer Documents]; Dennis S. Karjala, Copyright, Computer Software, and the
New Protectionism, 28 JURIMETRICS J. 33, 63-64 (1987) [hereinafter Karjala, New
Protectionism]; Timothy S. Teter, Note, Merger and the Machines: An Analysis of the ProCompatibility Trend in Computer Software Copyright Cases, 45 STAN . L. REV . 1061, 1063-66
(1993).
7
The first court before which issues of compatibility were raised termed the defendant's
desire to achieve compatibility “a commercial and competitive objective” irrelevant to the
intellectual property analysis. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d
1240, 1253 (3d Cir. 1983). That conclusion is discussed and rejected infra part III.B.
8
See, e.g., Peter S. Menell, Tailoring Legal Protection for Computer Software, 39STAN.
L REV . 1329, 1357-58, 1361-63 (1987) [hereinafter Menell, Tailoring Legal Protection].
3
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existing computer systems, or who may base selection of new systems
on the applications programs available. Manufacturers of computer
systems and operating systems have responded in a variety of different
ways to program developers' demands for access to interoperabilityrelated information. Some have made program interface specifications
and protocols freely available to applications developers.9 Others have
licensed the rights to create compatible programs to third parties,
although some withhold complete technical information on interoperability requirements from their licensees.10 Still others, chiefly
manufacturers of specialized computers designed to serve industry
specific customer bases, have attempted to keep their systems completely proprietary. 11 As a result of the frequent unavailability of interoperability-related information through ordinary market channels,
“reverse engineering” of interface specifications for proprietary and
quasi-proprietary systems has become common. In particular, many
third-party software developers have come to rely on a method of reverse engineering known as “disassembly” or “decompilation,” which
parses the binary object code in which computer programs are distributed into higher-level, human-readable commands.12
The rise of reverse engineering by third-party software developers
in turn has led some computer manufacturers to seek technological
protection against unwanted competitors.13 Within the video game
industry, several system manufacturers have developed specialized
“lock-out” programs that limit access to their hardware to program
disks or cartridges that contain the “key.”14
Lock-out programs are

9
Apple Computer and Microsoft Corporation fall within this category. Both companies
also compete with third-party developers to create applications programs compatible with their
respective operating systems. However, third-party developers have raised recurrent concerns
about whether the shared information is complete. See, e.g., Kathy Rebello et al., Is Microsoft
Too Powerful?, BUS . WK ., Mar. 1, 1993, at 82.
10
See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510,1514 (9th Cir. 1992), as
amended, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 78 (9th Cir. 1993); Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am.,
Inc., 30 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1401, 1403 (N.D. Cal. 1993); infra text accompanying notes 2627.
11
See, e.g., MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993)
(relating to a dispute over access to a completely proprietary system).
12
The process of reverse engineering through decompilation is described in detail in Andrew Johnson-Laird, Software Reverse Engineering in the Real World, 19 U. DAYTON L. REV.
843 (1994).
13
For a discussion of this technological one-upmanship, see Marshall Leaffer,
Engineering Competitive Policy and Copyright Misuse, 19 U. DAYTON L. REV . 1087, 1096-97
(1994).
14
See Sega, 977 F.2d at 1515; Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d
832, 836 (Fed. Cir. 1992).

1095
designed to exclude all “unauthorized” programs, and to make reverse
engineering more difficult.15 However, lock-out programs, like other
computer programs, also can be reverse engineered. Lock-out
programs therefore complicate, but do not defeat, third-party research
and development efforts. Ultimately, neither technological nor market
solutions have enabled computer manufacturers to prevent determined
competitors from creating and marketing compatible programs. As a
result, computer manufacturers and software developers have sought
recourse under the copyright and patent laws. They have argued that
both the reverse engineering process and the subsequent creation of
compatible programs that include “keys” to their systems infringe their
intellectual property rights.
Reverse engineering of interface specifications and use of the information gained through reverse engineering to create a compatible
program raise novel questions in the overlapping realms of copyright
law, patent law, and public policy. Over the past few years, there has
been an abundance of scholarship dealing with the appropriate scope of
copyright and patent protection for computer programs.16 This Article
approaches those problems from a slightly different perspective,
focusing on the discrete problem of lock-out programs. The choice of
lock-out as a paradigm for exploring the interoperability question and
the contours of copyright and patent protection of computer programs

15

See, e.g., Johnson-Laird, supra note 12, at 853-56 (describing the problems that
confront those seeking to reverse engineer a lock-out program).
16
Regarding copyright protection, see, for example, Anthony L. Clapes et al., Silicon
Epics and Binary Bards: Determining the Proper Scope of Copyright Protection for Computer
Programs, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1493 (1987); Karjala, Computer Documents, supra note 6;
Karjala, New Protectionism, supra note 6; Peter S. Menell, An Analysis of the Scope of
Copyright Protection for Application Programs, 41 STAN . L. REV . 1045 (1989) [hereinafter
Menell, Application Programs]; M enell, Tailoring Legal Protection, supra note 8; Arthur R.
miller, Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, Databases, and Computer-Generated
Works. Is Anything New Since CONTU?, 106 HARV . L. REV . 977 (1993); David A. Rice, Sega
and Beyond: A Beacon for Fair Use Analysis . . . At Least As Far As It Goes, 19 U.DAYTON L.
REV . 1131 (1994) [hereinafter Rice, Sega and Beyond]; Pamela Samuelson, Computer
Programs, User Interfaces, and Section 102(b) of the Copyright Act of 1976: A Critique of
Lotus v. Paperback, 6 HIGH T ECH . L.J. 209 (1992) [hereinafter Samuelson, Critique of
Paperback]; Pamela Samuelson, Creating a New Kind of Intellectual Property: Applying the
Lessons of the Chip Law to Computer Programs, 70 M INN. L. REV . 471 (1985) [hereinafter
Samuelson, Chip Law]; Pamela Samuelson, CONTU Revisited: The Case Against Copyright
Protection for Computer Programs in Machine-Readable Form, 1984 DUKE L.J. 663
[hereinafter Samuelson, CONTU Revisited]. Regarding patent protection, see, for example,
Donald S. Chisum, The Patentability of Algorithms, 47 U. PI T T . L. REV . 959 (1986); A.
Samuel Oddi, An Uneasier Case for Copyright Than for Patent Protection of Computer Programs, 72 NEB . L. REV . 351 (1993); Samuelson, Benson Revisited, supra note 3; Richard H.
Stem, Tales From the Algorithm War. Benson to Iwahashi, It's Deja Vu All Over Again, 18
AIPLA Q.J. 371 (1991).
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is informed by two considerations. First, for purposes of the interoperability inquiry, lock-out programs represent an extreme; they are
discrete, self-contained modules that are highly innovative in design,
yet that serve no purpose other than to regulate access to a computer or
computer operating system. Copyright and patent analyses of the lockout problem highlight a fundamental tension between intellectual
property rights and considerations of public access, and so afford a
useful vehicle for examining the scope of copyright and patent protection for computer programs generally. Second, lock-out may well become a defining technology of the coming “Information Age.” Pundits
have prophesied a “set-top box” in every home that affords a gateway
to an “information superhighway” where goods and services may be
purchased and information accessed.17 Whether or not the
manufacturer of the set-top box will be able to exclude unauthorized
purveyors of goods, services, and information will significantly affect
both the structure of the emerging market in information services and
the nature of individual participation in that market.18
The purpose of this Article is twofold. First, I argue that neither
the copyright laws nor the patent laws preclude duplication of protected program features, including “lock” and “key” features, to
whatever extent necessary to achieve full compatibility with an
unpatented computer system. Second, and more generally, I address
inconsistencies and conceptual flaws in the current understanding of
copyright and patent protection for computer programs that emerge
during the first inquiry, and propose doctrinal modifications to
resolve them. Although computer programs have been protected by
both copyright and patent regimes for years, the precise contours of the
protection these regimes afford remain unsettled. For that reason,
some scholars, computer lawyers, and computer industry professionals
have urged the adoption of sui generi protection for computer programs,19 but the question of sui generis protection may have become

17

See, e.g., Screen Test, T HE ECONOMIST , Sept. 17, 1994, at 17.
Among the leading contenders for development of a viable set-top box are none other
than the video game giants Sega and Nintendo, whose attempts to enforce lock-out protection
for their video game consoles are discussed below. See, e.g., George Gilder, Telecosm: The
Bandwidth Tidal Wave, FORBES , Dec. 5, 1994, at 162 (“If the personal computer cannot handle
these [data] streams, [TCI chief executive] John Malone's set-top boxes, Sega or Nintendo
game machines or [Microsoft chief executive] Bill Gates= new communications technology
will.”); Ken Yamaha, Standards Time. New Set-Top-Box Technology Key to Interactive TV,
COMPUTER RESELLER NE W S, Dec. 5, 1994, at 55.
19
See, e.g.,Menell, Tailoring Legal Protection, supra note 8, at 1371-72; Samuelson,
CONTU Revisited, supra note 16, at 762-69;Samuelson,Benson Revisited,supra note 3,at 1148-53; Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 94 COLUM . L. REV . 2308, 2342-64 (1994) [hereinafter Samuelson et al., Manifesto].
18
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largely irrelevant. The United States has convinced many other countries to follow its lead in “tending both copyright and patent protection
to computer programs and is unlikely to change course .20 For better or
worse, it seems we are stuck with the existing modes of intellectual
property protection for computer programs. However, this Article
argues that certain adjustments to the copyright and patent doctrines
governing the protection of computer programs are necessary if the
intellectual property laws are to continue to serve both their new and
their traditional functions.
Part I of this Article describes the facts and outcomes of two recent
cases: Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc.21 and Atari Games Corp.
v. Nintendo of America, Inc.,22 both of which involved attempts to
enforce intellectual property rights in lock-out programs. The remainder of the Article takes those cases as a starting point for discussion of the interoperability question and what it reveals about the scope
and structure of copyright and patent protection for computer
programs. Parts II and III explore the copyright implications of reverse
engineering interface specifications and lock-out programs and of
using the information gained thereby to create and market a compatible
program. Part II focuses on the copyright issues resulting from
intermediate copying during the reverse engineering process. Part III
considers whether the reverse engineer may create a program that
duplicates the “key” to the “lock” and other functional features of
interoperability-related routines. Part IV addresses issues bearing on
the validity of a lock-out patent. Finally, Part V considers whether, in
light of the analyses in Parts II, III, and IV, attempts to enforce patents
and copyrights against competitors who crack the code for a lockout
program constitute patent or copyright misuse. The Article concludes
with some general reflections on the efficacy and viability of the
copyright and patent models for intellectual property protection of
computer programs.

20
See, e.g., Samuelson et al., Manifesto, supra note 19, at 2313 & nn.7-8 (summarizing
recent international developments).
21
785 F. Supp. 1392 (N.D. Cal.), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir.
1992). as amended, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 78 (9th Cir. 1993).
22
18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1935 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (granting preliminary injunction), aff'd.
975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992), after remand, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1401 (N.D. Cal. 1993); 30
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1420 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
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I. THE SEGA AND ATARI CASES
Both Sega and Atari involved attempts to gain access to, and to
create interoperability with, video game consoles developed by industry giants. Sega Enterprises Ltd. manufactures the Sega Genesis, a
video entertainment console system that accepts video game cartridges.23 Nintendo of America, Inc. distributes the Nintendo Entertainment System (“NES”), a similar device.24 Both companies are
leaders in the home video entertainment market.25 Both license the
rights to create games compatible with their consoles to independent
developers of video game programs, but only under agreements that
withhold from the licensees the actual information needed to achieve
interoperability. Instead, the agreements require that the licensor (Sega
or Nintendo) be the exclusive manufacturer of the games developed by
the licensee. The licensor supplies the missing information during the
manufacturing process, and then resells the completed games to the
licensee for commercial distribution.26 Neither Sega nor Nintendo
holds a U.S. patent on its console.27
A. SEGA V. ACCOLADE
Both factually and legally, Sega is the simpler case. Accolade, an
independent developer of home computer game software for a variety
of computer systems, wanted to expand its product line to include
games compatible with the Genesis console, but was unwilling to cede
control over manufacturing the games to Sega.28 To discover the requirements for interoperability with the Genesis console, Accolade's
engineers “reverse engineered” the microcode contained in several
Sega video game cartridges by using a process known as “decompilation” to translate the binary object code into human-readable form.29

23

Sega, 977 F.2d at 1514.
Atari, 975 F.2d at 835-36.
25
In 1994, they each controlled approximately 50% of the U.S. home video game
market. See, e.g., Merrill Goozner, Rivals Nose in on Nintendo, CHI. T RIB ., June 12, 1994, ' 7
at 1.
26
Sega, 977 F.2d at 1514; Atari, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1403.
27
Sega, 977 F.2d at 1526; Atari, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1401-02.
28
Sega, 977 F.2d at 1514.
29
Id. at 1514-15. Initially, computer programs are written in human-readable form
known as source code. In order to be functional, however, a computer program must be translated from source code into machine-readable form, or object code. See Johnson-Laird, supra
note 12, at 856-59. Object code cannot be translated back into source code, but can be
translated into a lower-level human-readable form, known as assembly language, by
decompilation. See id. at 872-79, 896-97.
24
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Ultimately, the engineers successfully identified the interface specifications for the Genesis console and released Accolade's first Genesiscompatible game.30 In the process, however, they had made numerous
copies of Sega's copyrighted microcode.
While Accolade's reverse engineering efforts were in progress,
Sega began manufacturing its consoles to include a trademark security
system (“TMSS”),31 a lock-out device that operated by searching each
game cartridge inserted into the console for four bytes of data present
at a particular location in all Sega-produced game programs.32 If the
console did not find the “TMSS initialization code” at the necessary
location in the game program, it would not allow the game to operate.33
When Sega introduced the Genesis III console, the first to include the
TMSS, at a consumer electronics show, Accolade observed that its
reverse engineered games would not operate on the Genesis III.34
Further study of the decompiled Sega programs revealed a small
segment of code, containing approximately twenty-five bytes of data,
which Accolade's engineers had determined to be unnecessary for
interoperability with the original Genesis console, and so had omitted
from their summary of specifications for a Genesis-compatible game.
After studying the segment, which contained the TMSS initialization
code, Accolade “added the code to its development manual in the form
of a standard header file to be used in all games.”35 Shortly thereafter,
Accolade released several games for use with the Genesis III.
Sega filed suit for copyright infringement against Accolade in the
Northern District of California.36
The district court granted Sega's

30

Sega, 977 F.2d at 1515.
According to Sega, the TMSS was adopted solely as a response to software pirates
who had discovered a way to produce copies of Sega's video game cartridges without the
initial screen display of Sega's trademark. The TMSS was designed both to “lock out”
unauthorized cartridges and to “lock in” an initial screen display of Sega's trademark, thereby
protecting Sega's ability to prosecute pirates for trademark infringement. Id.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id. at 1516. Unbeknownst to Accolade, the “standard header file” that rendered its
games compatible with Sega's new console also triggered a screen display that stated “PRODUCED BY OR UNDER LICENSE FROM SEGA ENTERPRISES LTD.” Id. at 1515.
36
Sega also asserted claims for trademark infringement and false designation of origin in
violation of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. '' 1114(l)(a), 1125(a) (1988). Arguing that the TMSS
enabled Sega to falsely pass off Accolade=s games as its own, Accolade counterclaimed for
false designation of origin. The district court found accolade, not Sega, responsible for the
misleading screen display of the Sega trademark message. Sega Enters, Ltd. v. Accolade Inc.,
785 F. Supp. 1392, 1400 (N.D. Cal.) aff=d in part and rev=d in part, 977, F.2d 1510 (9th Cir.
1992), as amended 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 78 (9th Cir. 1993).
31
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motion for a preliminary injunction. It found that Accolade had
infringed Sega's copyrights in its video game programs by making
unauthorized copies and translations of Sega's microcode during the
reverse engineering process.37 The court further ruled that Accolade's
conduct could not be considered a fair use, because its motive in reverse engineering Sega's games was commercial and had resulted in
the creation of a competing product.38 Accordingly, the court barred
Accolade from further disassembly or use of Sega's video game programs and from selling its reverse engineered games.39
The Ninth Circuit reversed.40 The court agreed with the district
court that Accolade's creation of copies and translations during the
reverse engineering process constituted infringement under the literal
terms of the Copyright Act.41 However, it held that decompilation of
computer object code is a fair use privileged by the Act when there is
no other way to gain access to the functional requirements for interoperability, which are not protected by copyright.42 Writing for the
court, Judge Reinhardt emphasized the uniquely opaque nature of
computer programs that are distributed for public use in object code
form, readable only by machine.43 The court concluded that to deem
Accolade's decompilation unfair would be to grant Sega a de facto
monopoly over access to the Genesis III, although it held no patent on
the console.44

37

Sega, 785 F. Supp. at 1396-97. Section 106 of the Copyright Act reserves to the copyright owner the exclusive right to make or authorize copies or derivative works. 17 U.S.C. '
106(l), (3).
38
Sega, 785 F. Supp. at 1398. Section 107 of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. ' 107,
provides that otherwise infringing conduct may be considered a fair use of the copyrighted
material, depending on the circumstances of the use. See infra note 81.
39
Id. at 1402.
40
Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992), as amended, 1993
U.S. App. LEXIS 78 (9th Cir. 1993).
41
Id. at 1518-20.
42
Id. at 1523-28. The court relied on section 102(b) of the Act, which provides that copyright protection does not extend “to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation,
concept, principle, or discovery.” 17 U.S.C. ' 102(b).
43
Id. at 1525-26.
44
Id. at 1526-27. The Ninth Circuit also rejected the district court's resolution of the
trademark issues. It held that Sega, not Accolade, bore primary responsibility for the
confusing Sega trademark message display because Sega had intended the TMSS to produce a
misleading screen display in some circumstances. Id. at 1528-30.
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B. ATARI V. NINTENDO
The basic fact pattern in Atari was similar to that in Sega. To
ensure that only video games developed by Nintendo or its authorized
licensees would operate on the NES, Nintendo developed a “security
system” for the NES .45 The system consists of two microprocessors: a
“master” chip in the console and a “slave” chip in the video game
cartridge, each containing Nintendo's copyrighted 10NES program. 46
When the cartridge is inserted into the console, the two 10NES programs generate and exchange a series of values based on an initial,
randomly selected number. The master program then compares the
results. If the final digits of the two series are equal, the console is
unlocked and the operator may proceed to play the game.47 If they are
not equal, the console remains in a reset mode and the game will not
operate.48
In its efforts to reverse engineer the NES security system, Atari
analyzed the output of the 10NES program and also chemically
“peeled” the security system chip to examine the 10NES microcode
embedded in it.49 When these initial efforts failed, Atari decided to
become a Nintendo licensee.50 Unhappy with Nintendo's restrictive
license terms, however, Atari continued its reverse engineering efforts.
Ultimately, Atari's engineers produced the Rabbit program, a program
that was “functionally indistinguishable” from the 10NES program.51
Atari then began marketing its own games for the NES.
Atari differed from Sega in two crucial respects. First, Nintendo
had applied for and received a U.S. patent on the NES security system.52 Atari's reverse engineering, therefore, raised questions of patent infringement as well as copyright infringement. Second, as part of
its reverse engineering process, Atari committed fraud on the Copyright Office. Although Atari's engineers were able to decipher much

45

Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 836 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
Id.
47
Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1401, 1403 (N.D.
Cal. 1993).
48
Id. at 1410-11.
49
Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1935, 1936 (N.D.
Cal. 1991). “Peeling” is a process by which successive layers of the circuitry embedded in a
microchip are removed and studied. Because successful peeling reveals, at most, an object
coded version of the program under study, it cannot substitute for decompilation. SeeJohnsonLaird, supra note 12, at 863-64.
50
Atari, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1936.
51
Id. at 1937.
52
U.S. Patent No. 4,799,635 (1989).
46
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of the code embedded in the NES “slave” microprocessor, they failed
to produce a complete translation of the program. 53 Atari's attorneys
then applied to the Copyright Office for a copy of the 10NES program,
stating that they needed the code because Atari was a defendant in
infringement litigation involving the program.54 Since no lawsuit had
yet been filed, that was an outright misrepresentation.55
When Atari began producing unauthorized NES-compatible games,
Nintendo filed suit for copyright and patent infringement.56 In support
of its motion for a preliminary injunction, it argued that both Atari's
final product and its intermediate copying of the 10NES program
during the reverse engineering process infringed the 10NES
copyright.57 In response, Atari argued that it had copied, and taken,
only functional elements unprotected by copyright.58 The district court
sided with Nintendo. It ruled that even if the doctrine of merger
excused some similarities between the Rabbit and 10NES programs,
Atari had taken more than necessary to achieve interoperability. 59 The
court also found that Nintendo was likely to succeed on its intermediate copying argument.60
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction.61
Regarding intermediate copying, it held that
Atari's procurement of an unauthorized copy of the 10NES program
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Atari, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1936.
Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 836 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 897 F.2d 1572,1574-75 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
First, Nintendo sent letters to Atari's retailers threatening suit if sales of the unauthorized
games continued, and Atari sued Nintendo for antitrust violations and unfair competition.
Nintendo's subsequent copyright and patent infringement lawsuit was consolidated with
Atari's. Id. at 1575. Atari requested, and the district court granted, a preliminary injunction
barring Nintendo from suing retailers of Atari's NES-compatible games. However, the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed, ruling that Atari had not adduced sufficient facts
on the issue of Nintendo's allegedly anticompetitive conduct. Id. at 1577-78. Atari's antitrust
counterclaims and its related copyright and patent misuse defenses were subsequently severed
for separate trial following trial of Nintendo's infringement claims. See Rex Bossert, Nintendo
Is Victorious in Patent Claim Against Foe, S.F. DAILY J., July 30,1993, at 1, 7.
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Atari, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1938.
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Id.
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copying that expression.” Concrete Mach. Co. v. Classic Lawn Ornaments, Inc., 843 F.2d 600,
606 (1st Cir. 1988); see also Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742
(9th Cir. 1971) (holding that protecting expression that is inseparable from an idea would
confer an impermissible monopoly on the idea).
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Atari, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1939.
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Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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from the Copyright Office constituted infringement.62 It further held
that Atari's misconduct in obtaining the copy precluded any attempt by
Atari to invoke the fair use defense to shield its other reverse
engineering efforts.63 Regarding Atari's final product, the Federal
Circuit agreed with the district court that Nintendo had made a
sufficient preliminary showing of substantial similarity between the
Rabbit and the 10NES by establishing that Atari's Rabbit program
“incorporate[d] elements of the 10NES program unnecessary for the
chip's performance.”64
On remand, the district court granted summary judgment for
Nintendo on its copyright infringement claims. Examination of the
10NES and Rabbit programs revealed, and Atari did not dispute, that
Atari had duplicated some 10NES functions that were unnecessary to
achieve interoperability with the version of the NES then on the market.65 Atari argued that it needed to create a program “functionally
indistinguishable” from the 10NES to preclude any attempt by
Nintendo to lock Atari's game cartridges out of future versions of the
NES.66 The district court declined to extend the Sega rule to cover
copying intended to achieve future interoperability “absent further
guidance from the Ninth Circuit or Congress.”67 The court ruled, in
essence, that those functional attributes of the 10NES unnecessary for
current interoperability were expressive elements of the program's
structure, and so entitled to copyright protection. 68
The court also granted Nintendo partial summary judgment on its
patent infringement claims.
Although Atari had written a different
program to generate the results required by the 10NES, the court
ruled that Atari's Rabbit program infringed the 10NES patent under
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Id. at 841-42.
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Id. at 845.
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Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1420,1423 (N.D.
Cal. 1993).
66
See id.; Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
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10NES chip, unless the Rabbit chip also performed those functions. See id. at 1406-07; infra
text accompanying note 279.
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Atari, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1408.
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Id. at 1407 n.14; Atari, 30 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1423. However, the court ruled that
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10NES program. Atari, 30 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1403-06.
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the doctrine of equivalents.69 However, Atari had raised several challenges to the validity of Nintendo's patent. Among other things, Atari
argued that the use of a lock-out system in conjunction with a reset pin
for disabling the console was obvious (or anticipated) in light of a
previously issued patent for an electronic security system, not cited to
or discovered by the examiner who approved the 10NES patent, and a
home computer system designed by the inventor of that patent that
included a reset pin and that was on the market when the 10NES system was developed.70 The district court found Atari's arguments sufficient to defeat summary judgment for Nintendo on the obviousness
issues.71 In July 1993, however, an eight-member jury rejected Atari's
position.72
Success on its copyright and patent infringement claims would
not necessarily have guaranteed Nintendo victory in the litigation because Atari's misuse defenses and antitrust counterclaims still remained
to be tried.73 Had Atari prevailed at the second trial, Nintendo would
have been barred from enforcing its infringement judgment . 74 Eight
months after the conclusion of the infringement trial, however, Atari
and Nintendo settled the case.75 How the district court would have
resolved the misuse and antitrust issues thus remains a matter for
speculation.
II. THE DECOMPILATION DEBATE:
FAIR USE OR FOUL PLAY?
As Sega and Atari illustrate, any debate over permissible uses of
knowledge gained through decompilation becomes purely academic if
decompilation is not itself permissible. This part evaluates the Sega
court's resolution of that question .76 Although many commentators
69

Id. at 1414-15. See infra note 310.
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nonobviousness for patentability).
71
Id. at 1418-19.
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Bossert, supra note 56, at 1.
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See supra note 56.
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See infra part V.A.3.
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See Nintendo, Atari Games Reach Settlement, L.A. T IMES , Mar. 25, 1994, at D2; Atari
and Nintendo End Court Battle, Begin Media Battle Fracas, COMPUTER LAW ., May 1994, at
28.
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Accolade also argued that section 117 of the Copyright Act, which allows copying of a
computer program as an essential step in the utilization of the program, permits decompilation.
Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1520 (9th Cir. 1992), as amended, 1993
U.S. App. LEXIS 78 (9th Cir. 1993). The Ninth Circuit rejected that argument, in my view
correctly, on the ground that section 117 encompasses only the right to load a copy of a
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117 might be interpreted to allow decompilation. Charles R. McManis, Intellectual Property
Protection and Reverse Engineering of Computer Programs in the United States and the
European Community, 8 HIGH T ECH . L.J. 25, 94-95 (1993) (discussing Vault Corp. v. Quaid
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have praised the Sega decision as forward-thinking,77 the fair use analysis adopted by the Sega court also has drawn some high-powered criticism. Most notably, in his recent comprehensive review of computer
copyright law, Professor Arthur Miller assails the Ninth Circuit's application of the fair use doctrine as misguided and “singularly ill-suited
to vindicating the public interest.”78 Even a recent student note by an
unabashed fan of thin copyright protection for software interface
specifications finds the court's analysis “strained.”79 This reception
doubtless would come as no surprise to the Sega court, which
acknowledged that the result it reached⎯allowing “wholesale copying” by a competitor intent on producing a competing product⎯ “may
seem incongruous at first blush.”80 Are the critics' reactions warranted?
Careful consideration of the nature of computer programs and the
patterns of innovation and dissemination of new developments within
the computer industry suggests that they are not. Sega is faithful to
both the letter and the spirit of the copyright laws.
In determining whether Accolade's copying was a fair use, the Sega
court engaged in a lengthy analysis of the four factors enumerated in
the fair use provision, section 107 of the Copyright Act.81 The
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See, e.g., Karjala, Computer Documents, supra note 6, at 993-94, 1015-16; McManis,
supra note 76, at 55-74, Rice, Sega and Beyond, supra note 16; Pamela Samuelson, Fair Use
for Computer Programs and Other Copyrightable Works in Digital Form: The Implications of
Sony, Galoob, and Sega, 1 J. INTELL . PROP . L. 49, 86-102 (1993); S. Carran Daughtrey, Note,
Reverse Engineering of Software for Interoperability and Analysis, 47 VAND . L REV. 145, 17281 (1994). Even prior to Sega, many copyright scholars had advocated a fair use solution to the
decompilation problem. See Donald S. Chisum et al., LaST Frontier Conference Report on
Copyright Protection of Computer Software, 30 JURIMETRICS J. 15, 24-25 (1989) [hereinafter
Chisum et al., LaST Frontier Conference Report]; Jessica Litman, Copyright and Information
Policy, LA W & CONTEMP . PROBS ., Spring 1992, at 185, 196-201; J.H. Reichman, Computer
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Commercialized University Research, 42 VAND . L. REV . 639, 694 n.288, 702 n.324 (1989). In
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Accolade. See Brief Amicus Curiae of Eleven Copyright Law Professors in Sega Enterprises,
Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 33 JURIMETRICS J. 147 (1992).
78
Miller, supra note 16, at 1020. Professor Miller was a signatory to an amicus brief filed
by the Computer and Business Equipment Manufacturers Association (ACBEMA@) on behalf
of Sega.
79
Teter, supra note 6, at 1087.
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Sega Enters. Ltd, v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1527 (9th Cir. 1992), as amended,
1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 78 (9th Cir. 1993).
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See id. at 1522-27. Section 107 of the Copyright Act lists four nonexclusive factors for
courts to consider in determining whether a particular use of a copyrighted work is fair:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether use is of a commercial
nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
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application of these factors to computer programs raises several novel
questions, and brings other unresolved issues concerning the scope of
the fair use doctrine into sharp focus. Ultimately, the answers to these
questions turn on, and require decisions about, the purpose and role of
fair use in the overall scheme of copyright protection. This part
analyzes the individual statutory fair use factors as they relate to lockout, and then considers the implications of the decompilation debate,
and the Sega court's resolution of it, for an overarching vision of fair
use.
A. CHARACTERIZING COMPUTER PROGRAMS
Conceptually, the Sega court's analysis began and ended with the
second statutory factor: the nature of the copyrighted work. The court
observed that when computer programs are distributed in object code
form, the only means of access to their unprotected functional features,
even for trained programmers, necessarily involves preparing humanreadable copies or derivative works.82 Accordingly, core principles of
copyright law would seem to require that reverse engineers be allowed
to keep records of their progress; otherwise, “the owner of the
copyright gains a de facto monopoly over the functional aspects of his
work⎯aspects that were expressly denied copyright protection by
Congress.”83
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Sega, 977 F.2d at 1525-26. This unique characteristic of computer programs has been
documented by many scholars, including a number who are familiar with the technical aspects
of computer programming. See, e.g., Gary R. Ignatin, Comment, Let the Hackers Hack:
Allowing the Reverse Engineering of Copyrighted Computer Programs to Achieve
Compatibility, 140 U. PA . L. REV . 1999,2001 n.6 (1992); Johnson-Laird, supra note 12, at
890-95; see also Karjala, New Protectionism, supra note 6, at 37; Menell, Tailoring Legal
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of fair use. See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 1392,1399 (N.D. Cal .), aff 'd
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copyright is not the means of decompilation used, but the fact that decompilation is not
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83
Sega, 977 F.2d at 1526; see 17 U.S.C. ' 102(b).
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1. “One of These Things Is Not Like the Others”: Computer
Programs as Literary Works
Professor Miller's objection to the Sega court's analysis of the
second statutory factor is that computer programs are “literary works”
under the Copyright Act and therefore should be treated no differently
from other literary works for fair use purposes.84 That is, intermediate
copying of a computer program's creative content⎯an inevitable
consequence of decompilation because protected and unprotected
portions cannot be distinguished until they have been translated into
human-readable form⎯should be prohibited, because such copying
would not be allowed for other literary works. The assumption implicit
in this argument⎯that intermediate copying of a traditional literary
work's creative content can never be a fair use⎯is addressed below in
the discussion of the first statutory factor.85 As to the second statutory
factor, the objection that computer programs are classified as literary
works, while accurate as a statement of positive law, 86 is so broad as
to be virtually meaningless as a guide for courts struggling to apply
section 107 in the computer software context. To the extent that
generalizations about the nature of “literary works” are possible,
however, what they reveal is that the statutory classification of
computer programs as literary works confuses more often than it
clarifies.
First, the classification of computer programs as “literary works”
is staggeringly uninformative. As defined by the Copyright Act, “literary works” include all works “expressed in words, numbers, or other
verbal or numerical symbols or indicia”87⎯in other words, not only
novels and essays, but also textbooks, reference works, directories,
greeting cards, and everything in between. The proportion of creative,
protectable expression in these works varies enormously. 88 Thus, to
state that a computer program is, legislatively speaking, a “literary
work” proves nothing about the scope of the protection courts should
afford it. The copyright protection for which the work is eligible is a
function of the work's relative proportions of creative and noncreative
content.
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Miller, supra note 16, at 1022.
See infra text accompanying notes 147-55.
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Assuming for the moment that computer programs are properly
viewed as literary works,89 then to which types of literary work should
computer programs be compared? Professor Miller acknowledges that
“the scope of protection given to different types of literary works may
vary.”90 Yet he consistently compares computer programs to works of
literature such as “Steinbeck's [The] Grapes of Wrath, Hemingway's
The Sun Also Rises, or Miller's Death of a Salesman” without once
explaining why they should not instead (or also) be compared to the
Physician's Desk Reference or the Pacific Bell Yellow Pages.91 The
parallels between computer programs and literary classics are far from
obvious. A computer program is, first and foremost, a series of instructions to the computer to execute a given task.92 The instructions
themselves may be written or arranged with more or less creativity, but
that is not their primary significance. In this respect, a successful
program is more analogous to a well-designed, easy-to-use directory of
information, or to a cookbook, than to a novel or a play. Given this
defining characteristic of computer programs, there is no logical basis
for Professor Miller's conclusion that the scope of protection afforded
computer programs under Sega differs from that afforded other literary
works not only in scope, but in kind.93 Traditional literary works exist
on a continuum of protection; if computer programs are best
characterized as literary works, it certainly would be reasonable to
conclude that computer programs constitute a new endpoint on that
continuum.
A far more reasonable conclusion, however, is that computer programs do not lie on the literary works continuum at all. Even among
highly utilitarian literary works, the barriers to access created by distribution of computer programs in object code form have no analogue.94 Thus, it is by no means obvious that computer programs can
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In my opinion, they are not. See infra text accompanying notes 94-105.
Miller, supra note 16, at 1022.
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supra note 16, at 672-82. Indeed, the definition of “computer program” in the Copyright Act
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or should be compared with literary works rather than with some other
category of copyrightable works or viewed as sui generis in many
critical respects.95 As Professor Miller's commentary illustrates,
treating computer programs as literary works too easily complicates
the task of determining the scope of software copyright by importing
into the analysis preconceptions of marginal relevance. The Sega court,
in contrast, treated computer programs simply as “utilitarian works,”
and so avoided that pitfall.96 Arguably, one of the lessons of Sega is
that the classification of computer programs as literary works is
inappropriate and breeds confusion.
The rationale for the statutory classification of computer programs
as literary works, which originated in the Copyright Act of 1976, is
unclear. Apparently, neither Congress nor CONTU97 deemed it worthy
of discussion.98 It appears that both Congress and CONTU simply
concluded that because they are written or typed (as opposed to
sculpted, drawn, or rendered in musical notes), computer programs are
more similar to literary works than to works in the other categories of
copyrightable works listed in section 102(a) of the Act. Both legally
and factually, that conclusion is dubious.

95
Because comparison and analogy are the essence of legal reasoning, it would be futile
to suggest dispensing with them entirely where computer programs are concerned. However,
as the Sega court recognized, reconciling existing legal categories with new technologies
requires great care to Aavoid the temptation of trying to force 'the proverbial square peg in[tol a
round hole.@= Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1527 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting
Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 712 (2d Cir. 1992)), as amended,
1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 78 (9th Cir. 1993).
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See H.R. REP . NO . 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5667; CONTU, FINAL REPORT , supra note 4. Significantly, Congress did
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As a matter of copyright law, denominating computer programs
“writings” tells us nothing about how to categorize them, because
constitutionally every work protected by the copyright laws is a
“writing.”99 As a practical matter, a rule that all works expressed in
“numerical symbols or indicia” are “literary works” also encompasses
audiovisual and musical works created and expressed digitally.100 In
terms of use, computer programs also exhibit similarities to works in
several of the other statutory categories. To the extent that computer
programs constitute a script for the computer to follow, they may be
argued to resemble “dramatic works” that are “performed” by the
computer.101 In other ways, computer programs are analogous to
“pictorial, graphic . . . or scrulptural works.”102 in that they constitute a
map or set of blueprints for accomplishing a task.103
Compassion to other statutory categories is more than an exercise
in semantics. Each change in the statutory reference point conjures up
a slightly different body of precedent and different variations on the
basic approach to identifying what the copyright in the work
protects.104 The difficulty of selecting the statutory category of
protected works to which computer programs are most analogous, and
of finding a good fit in any category, suggests that computer programs
may be most appropriately regarded as sui generis forms of creative
expression.
That conclusion is not new; the unique nature of computer programs has long been a rallying cry for advocates of a wholly sui
generis system of intellectual property protection.105 My intent here is
more modest; at minimum, sections 101 and 102(a) of the Copyright
Act should be amended to ensure that computer programs are properly
viewed as unique⎯a ninth category of copyrightable works. As the
debate over the Sega decision illustrates, the epistemological consequences of the current classification of computer programs are not
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trivial. Part III demonstrates that those consequences become even
more significant during evaluation of the alleged copier’s final product
for substantial similarity to the copyrighted work. By signaling courts
to abandon preconceptions about “literary works” and to adopt a more
flexible, open-minded approach to computer copyright cases, an
amendment acknowledging sui generis status would encourage more
thoughtful decisionmaking regarding the scope of copyright protection
available.
2. Defining “Publication” in the Context of Machine-Readable
Works
For fair use purposes, the nature of the copied work is determined
in part by whether it was published or unpublished when the copying
occurred.106 Traditionally, courts have accorded unpublished works
much greater protection and have been less willing to treat copying of
such works as fair use.107 In an effort to turn the characteristics of
object code to its advantage, Sega argued that its program should be
considered unpublished because they were distributed for public use
only in object code form. The Ninth Circuit summarily rejected that
argument,108 but it deserves more than summary treatment. Whether
and when computer programs distributed in object code form become
published works for purposes of copyright is a question of great
significance in assessing the level of protection that the Copyright Act
affords them. Once again, the search for answers suggests that a
traditional copyright concept developed in the context of artistic and
literary works⎯here, publication⎯in unhelpful when analyzing
computer programs.
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See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v Nations Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 564 (1985);
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(9th Cir. 1992), aff=g 780 F. Supp. 1293 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
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The rationale for concluding that Sega's program was a published
work was that once a program is distributed for public use it is published for purposes of copyright.109 At first glance, classification of
computer programs distributed for public use in object code form as
“published” works is entirely consistent with the treatment of other
machine-readable works under the Act. For example, musical works on
record, compact disc, or cassette are deemed published when sold,
even though the works cannot be played without stereo equipment.110
However, musical works distributed in machine-readable form and
computer programs differ in one significant respect. Playing a
machine-readable musical work discloses its substance, while using a
computer program need not. Because computer programs are functional rather than artistic works, they may be distributed to and used by
the public without disclosing the manner in which they are written or
the methods by which they operate. Conversely, computer programs in
human-readable form cannot perform the functions they describe; thus,
there would be no consumer market for them.
Professor Miller suggests that Congress was aware of the peculiar
problem posed by computer programs when it amended the fair use
statute in 1992 to state that the fact that a work is unpublished will not
automatically preclude a finding of fair use.111 The bill's sponsor, Senator Simon, noted that the amendment was “not intended to provide
new fair use access” through decompilation, nor to “broaden the fair
use of unpublished computer programs.”112 These statements are less
significant than Professor Miller makes them seem. As is its wont
when considering section 107, Congress took a cautious approach to
assessing the current state of the law. It stated only that it did not
intend to “alter” fair use access to unpublished works; it did not attempt to state the current rule or dictate what it should be.113 Moreover, nowhere did Senator Simon, or anyone else, suggest that
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publicly distributed object-coded computer programs are “unpublished.”114 Thus, the legislative history simply returns us to the initial
problem.
A rule that public distribution in any form constitutes publication
makes sense given the rationale for heightened protection for unpublished works. The unpublished work doctrine protects the author's right
of creative control. 115 Allowing the author to determine when a work is
ready for release also protects the public, by assuring sufficient time to
polish the work to the author's standards.116 A commercial (or not-forprofit) distribution of the work signifies a decision that the work has
met the author's standards and is ready for release. The greater
protection accorded to unpublished works also allows the author to
reap the first commercial benefits from distribution of the work (or to
elect to forgo those profits for not-for-profit distribution).117 All of
these rationales seem to apply with equal force to computer programs.
It might be argued that computer programs are different from most
other copyrighted works that are distributed to the public, in that
versions released to customers often are subject to continuing upgrades
and other revisions, both as the “author” deems necessary and in
response to customer complaints and requests. However, the mere fact
that the programmer may have an ongoing relationship with the
program after its release should not call into question the program's
“published” status. Many textbooks, casebooks, and treatises also are
updated on an ongoing basis, without thereby losing their unquestioned
status as published works. And the rationale for considering such
works published applies even so, because the author's initial decision
to release the work, and any economic benefit gained thereby, cannot
be changed by later events.
Finally, a “public distribution equals publication” rule also is consistent with other aspects of the copyright treatment of computer programs. The bare fact that the copyright afforded a program extends to
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the object code mandates that pubic distribution of a program in object
code form be considered a publication of the program. 118 Any other
rule would, in effect, confer heightened protection on object code⎯an
incorrect result, given that copyright protection only extends to the
zeros and ones of object code because they are derived from the human
expression contained in the original source code.119 The Copyright Act
should not be used to bootstrap de facto trade secret protection for
publicly distributed works.
Still unaddressed by the foregoing discussion, however, is what
“public distribution” means. Both Sega and the case on which it relied,
Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of America, Inc.,120 involved
programs distributed to retail customers.121 As a result, neither court
considered the variety of other ways in which computer programs are
distributed and the application of section 107 to those programs.122
Whether the limited decompilation privilege established in Sega applies to programs not distributed directly to the general public is a
more difficult question. It is conceivable, for example, that a program
with limited distribution to a small number of licensees, subject to
contractual restrictions on disclosure, could be considered unpublished.
Referring back to the purposes of the unpublished work doctrine,
however, the reasons that programs available for retail purchase should
be considered published works apply with equal force to programs
distributed on a more limited basis. By definition, any distribution to
customers or distributors, however small, still reflects the author's
choice and the author's decision that the program is suitable for release.
Extending the Lewis Galoob Toys ruling to any distribution of a
copyrighted computer program thus would preserve both the author's
right of control and the public's interest. By the same token, that
reasoning would not apply to releases known as “beta test copies,”
which are distributed on a trial basis with the understanding that they
are unfinished, prerelease products.123
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As a practical matter, however, limited distribution programs typically are licensed rather than sold,124 and the price of licensing a proprietary program usually includes an agreement not to reverse engineer
the program. A question that courts and litigants eventually must
confront is whether a contractual restriction on reverse engineering is
valid. Contracts that alter the existing balance of common law property
rights are commonplace, and license agreements for proprietary
computer programs that alter the balance of rights established by the
Copyright Act follow in that tradition. Copyright's debt to common law
property rights and the theories of ownership in which they are rooted
is significant.125 However, modern-day copyright is substantially a
creature of public policy. Arguably, to the extent that private contracts
frustrate that policy⎯for example, by divesting licensees of a right of
access to unprotectable information⎯they are unenforceable.126 The
courts have yet to resolve this question. Their answer will determine
whether the reverse engineering privilege established in Sega applies
to all computer programs, or only to some.
B. COMMERCIAL ACTORS AND ENABLING USES:
REFINING THE “COMMERCIAL PURPOSE” TEST
The first statutory fair use factor is the purpose and character of the
use, “including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for
nonprofit educational purposes.”127 Accolade is a commercial actor,
and its ultimate purpose in copying Sega's code was unquestionably
commercial. For the district court in Sega, the fair use analysis
began and ended there.128 The Ninth Circuit rejected the district
court's bright-line approach to the purpose and character test in favor
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of a detailed, fact-specific analysis.129 Ultimately, the court concluded
that this statutory factor weighed in Accolade's favor, because Accolade had copied Sega's microcode solely in order to study its
unprotected elements.130
The Ninth Circuit's more circumspect approach to the purpose and
character inquiry has since been squarely vindicated. In Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,131 its first fair use opinion in nine years, the
Supreme Court warned against “elevating commerciality to hard presumptive significance,” and cited Sega with approval.132 The Court's
substantive analysis of the purpose and character test also tends to
support the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that Accolade's purpose in
decompiling Sega's copyrighted code was “legitimate [and] essentially
non-exploitative.”133 Together, Acuff-Rose and Sega suggest a conception of the first statutory fair use factor that is less rigid than the
simplistic commercial/noncommercial distinction and far better suited
to identifying permissible uses of copyrighted material within the
predominantly commercial field of computer programming.
The district court in Sega based its approach to the purpose and
character inquiry on the Supreme Court's opinions in Sony Corp. v.
Universal City Studios, Inc.134 and Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v.
Nation Enterprises. 135 In Sony, the first of the two decisions, the
Court remarked that “every commercial use of copyrighted material is
presumptively an unfair exploitation of the monopoly privilege that
belongs to the owner of the copyright.”136 This statement is noteworthy for two reasons. First, because Sony did not involve a commercial
use of copyrighted material, the Court's remark was dictum. Second,
the Court cited no authority whatsoever for the sweeping proposition
that every commercial use is presumptively unfair. Indeed, section
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107 itself is to the contrary; several of the activities listed in its
preamble as examples of fair use⎯news reporting, comment, and
criticism⎯are generally viewed as commercial endeavors.137 The
following year, in Harper & Row, which did involve a commercial use
of copyrighted material, the Court invoked the Sony dictum to support
its finding that the challenged use was unfair.138 invented out of whole
cloth in Sony and then cited and reinforced in Harper & Row, the
Court's sweeping generalization about an entire class of uses became a
lodestar of virtually every fair use decision handed down by the lower
courts over the next decade, Sega included.139
Copyright scholars were nearly unanimous in criticizing the commercial/noncommercial distinction as both simplistic and inherently
ambiguous.140 Acuff-Rose signals the Court's response to a decade's
worth of criticism: a full-blown retreat. Writing for the Court, Justice
Souter went to great lengths to characterize his analysis of the first fair
use factor as entirely consistent with Sony and Harper & Row.141
However, the Acuff-Rose opinion owes far more to the dissents in those
cases and to the scholarly criticism that followed them. In noting
the commercial nature of news reporting, criticism, and other fair
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uses enumerated in section 107, Justice Souter relied on Justice Brennan's dissent in Harper & Row.142 Following Justice Brennan's lead, he
expressly acknowledged that whether a use is, broadly speaking,
“commercial” in nature is not the sole determinant of its purpose and
character. The new standard the Court set forth for evaluating purpose
and character derives from the writings of Judge Pierre Leval, one of
the fair use doctrine's most thoughtful critics. The Court observed that
the statutory distinction between “commercial” and “noncommercial”
uses is, to a considerable degree, intended as shorthand for uses that do
or do not promote the purposes of copyright. Borrowing Judge Leval's
terminology, it reasoned that “the more transformative the new work,
the less will be the significance of other factors, like commercialism,
that may weigh against a finding of fair use.”143
Acuff-Rose's treatment of the first statutory factor signals a sea
change in the jurisprudence of fair use. However, the copying in Sega
raises issues that Acuff-Rose did not address. First, there is a far more
complex relationship between commercial activity and innovation in
the realm of creative expression than most courts have yet acknowledged. For some types of copyrightable works, including computer
programs, creativity and commercial endeavor are inextricably intertwined. Developing computer programs is expensive. Research and
development efforts may require significant investments of equipment,
personnel, and time. Those costs can only increase when product
development must be expedited to beat a close competitor to the
market. As a result, many of the most creative computer programming
innovations come from the corporate sector.144 In recent years,
research consortia, “technology transfer” programs, and other joint
ventures sponsored by corporate investors have become the preferred
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methods of innovation.145 In this environment, the commercial purpose
and character test is more than inapt. Applied without an understanding
of the unique constraints inherent in a form of creative expression that
requires a research and development budget, the test threatens to
remove the protection of fair use from an entire class of copyrightable
works, and so undermine incentives for further innovation. In short, the
first statutory factor cannot be applied to all types of copyrightable
works in the same way. In Sega, the Ninth Circuit implicitly
acknowledged this.146 With respect to the first statutory fair use factor,
the first lesson of Sega is that a fair use analysis must take into account
the mechanisms by which new works of a particular type are ordinarily
created.
Second, the “particular use” challenged by Sega was an intermediate, not an ultimate, one—copying as an essential but preliminary
step to developing a competing but hopefully noninfringing product.147
While Accolade's ultimate purpose was unquestionably commercial, its
intermediate purpose was to gain knowledge and understanding of
certain functional principles.148 The case thus required the court to
answer a novel question: To which of Accolade's purposes does the
first statutory factor refer—or, can the intermediate step of copying
solely to gain understanding be viewed as a fair use? Doctrinally
speaking, it is in this respect that Sega was a case of first impression.
While other cases had considered whether intermediate copying is
an infringement, no previous case had considered the fair use defense
in the context of intermediate copying.149
The Ninth Circuit
concluded, largely without discussion, that Accolade's immediate
purpose was dispositive, rather than its ultimate, unquestionably commercial one.150 Professor Miller, in contrast, focuses entirely on
Accolade's long-term commercial goal of competing with Sega in
the market for Genesis-compatible games. He argues that the copier's
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long range commercial goals should determine the outcome, even if
the final product is noninfringing.151 Yet his consideration of Accolade's intermediate purpose is as cursory as the Ninth Circuit's consideration of its ultimate purpose.
The language of section 107 is instructive in this regard. The first
statutory fair use factor seems to require only that a court evaluate the
purpose and character of the use that is challenged as infringing—here,
the intermediate use.152 The preamble further suggests that, in general,
privileged uses will be those that are intermediate in some fundamental
sense.153 To the extent that criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching, scholarship, and research all involve the use of copyrighted
materials, they do so as a means to a different end, whether that end is
the creation of a new work or simply the attainment of new
understanding that may lead to the creation of new works in the future.
In each case, the copier does not profit or benefit from distribution of
the chosen portions of the copied work, but rather from the original
contribution added or from the knowledge gained, which may then be
applied to the copier's own creative projects. The copied work serves
as raw material for both endeavors.
Self-evidently, not all intermediate uses will be fair ones. Some
intermediate uses involve no more than steps toward unauthorized
cutting and pasting of another's creative material; in that case, the
copied work is both the raw material and, essentially, the final product.
Thus, for example, the use of a scanner to scan works into a computer
for redistribution would not, standing alone, be a fair use, but simply
an unauthorized appropriation. However, as the foregoing discussion illustrates, a rule that privileges only transformative uses is too
narrow. Under the transformative use standard as outlined by Judge
Leval, to be fair, a use must seek to comment on the copied material in
some meaningful way. Yet the inclusion of teaching and research
among uses that are presumptively fair establishes that pedagogical
uses of copied material can be protected and that no new work incorporating portions of the copied work need be created.154 Thus, the
language of section 107 suggests that in appropriate circumstances, a
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use that simply enables understanding of the copied material may also
qualify as a fair use.155
How does Accolade's use of Sega's copyrighted work fare under
the “enabling use” standard I have suggested? Assuming that Accolade
conformed to prescribed procedures for reverse engineering (we will
later consider ways to ensure that the copier adheres to those procedures), Accolade sought only to understand Sega's work, not to
comment on or “transform” it. That motivation cannot be a reason to
hold Accolade's use unfair. Logically, whether a fair use has occurred
cannot turn solely on whether a new work is created that comments on
protected portions of the copied work. It would be odd if a use that
does not seek or rely on copyrighted material at all, other than to
understand it, were penalized more harshly than uses that do seek and
rely on creative material.156
Logic aside, the copier's motive is centrally relevant to consideration of the purpose and character of its use. Although it is hornbook
law that neither the copier's motive nor the nature of the use is relevant
to a determination of whether the copying has infringed the owner's
exclusive rights under the Copyright Act,157 fair use requires a
different, inherently equitable analysis. Motive alone will not determine whether a transformative or enabling use has occurred, but it is
indisputably relevant to any analysis conducted according to an “equitable rule of reason.”158 Equity may consider whether a copyrighted
material was intended to transform, to gain access to knowledge not
otherwise available, or merely to exploit.
Returning to Accolade's motive, we must consider whether the
motive of gaining access is legitimate in the eyes of the copyright laws.
Professor Miller argues that “the law imposes no duty on authors to
provide access to the ideas in a copyrighted work.”159
His views on
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access are rooted in his belief that “the base objective of copyright is
for society to benefit from the availability of creative works—that the
progress of science and the useful arts be ‘promoted’—whether or not
the literal expressions or underlying ideas of those works are directly
available to the public.”160 As a practical matter—and the Copyright
Act is nothing if not practical in intention—this view ignores the fact
that access to existing works by authors is closely related to the continued availability of new works to the public.161 Inspiration does not
occur in a vacuum. As the Supreme Court has recognized, the freedom
to build on the public domain elements of existing works promotes
copyright's overall purpose of promoting innovation.162 By necessary
implication, the Constitution and the Copyright Act mandate a right of
access to those elements.163
Professor Miller is, of course, correct that the Copyright Act contains no express provision mandating the accessibility of ideas. Before
the advent of computer programs, such a provision would have been
meaningless.164 However, whether the law mandates accessibility and
whether it allows access are separate questions. Permission to gain
access is implicit in the statutory provision that copyright protection
will not, under any circumstances, be granted to facts, functional principles, or ideas—so that the flow of new works will stimulate, not preclude, further innovation. 165 Allowing copying to gain access to a
program's functional elements thus does not frustrate the purpose of
copyright, but furthers it.
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Professor Miller's final criticism with respect to the purpose and
character of decompilation is a practical one. He argues that under the
regime established by Sega, courts will be unable to detect and punish
thefts of creative material in the competitor's final product, because a
competitor could “electronically massage the copy until every trace of
that illicit reproduction is obscured.”166 This observation betrays a
telling unfamiliarity with the actual process of computer
programming.167 Even if Professor Miller is right, however, the “massaging” process would not obviate the need for creative effort. Because
elements of a computer program's structure, sequence, and
organization may be protected by copyright, it is likely that a great deal
of effort would be required to remove all traces of creative expression
and idiosyncratic style.168 Moreover, the incentives to “overmassage”
the copy, and thereby avoid a judgment of infringement, are
considerable.
Arguably, however, a competitor who uses a copyrighted computer
program as a template for producing a program with the same
functionality is no different from an aspiring suspense novelist who
writes with the works of John LeCarre, Robert Ludlurn, and Tom
Clancy arrayed on the desk, or a romance novelist who consults Danielle Steele and Judith Krantz in the course of developing an “original”
plot line. The only difference, once again, is that the programmer
must decompile the program to understand what it is doing. The
quantum of originality required to bring a work within the ambit of
the Copyright Act is very small.169 A work may be “derivative,” critically speaking, without being a derivative work. In short, even if
computer programs are properly classified as “literary works,” there
are many more Danielle Steeles among programmers than Ernest
Hemingways. More to the point, a pre-existing program, like a preexisting novel, may be consulted for ideas, systems, procedures, and
methods of operation—elements that copyright does not protect.170
The second programmer who also imitates protected expression might
infringe, but to bar programmers from consulting the copyrighted
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program at all would confer more protection on computer programs
than on other copyrighted works.
Assuming, however, that allowing the competitor continued access
to the copied work creates too great a risk, there is a simple enough
solution: make “clean room” programming a precondition for a finding
of fair use. Under a clean room protocol, the task of decompiling the
copyrighted program and that of developing a new program are carried
out by two different teams of programmers. The second team, charged
with program development, is provided with the functional
specifications extracted from the decompiled program by the first
team, but no more .171 Accolade used clean room procedures, and that
fact weighed heavily in its favor.172 Courts assessing decompilation
could easily require that clean room procedures be followed and
documented; the burden would then shift to the copyright owner to
show, as it must for a finding of infringement with respect to the copier's final product, that protected material was taken.
C. HOW MUCH DECOMPILATION IS TOO MUCH?
The Ninth Circuit in Sega agreed with the district court that the
third statutory factor, the amount and substantiality of the copying,
weighed against Accolade.173 However, the court noted that the factor
was “of very little weight” given the limited nature of Accolade's
ultimate use of Sega's code.174 The court's dismissive treatment of the
third factor is consistent with the case law, which indicates that the
amount copied is perhaps the least critical factor of the four.175 However, as Professor Miller notes, the court's sudden focus on ultimate
use is inconsistent with its approach to the purpose and character inquiry.176 Where the use alleged to be fair is intermediate, the court
should consider the amount and substantiality of the copying done at
the intermediate stage.
As the Sega court observed, evaluation of the amount and substantiality of Accolade's intermediate copying did not bode well for
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Accolade, because it had copied Sega's entire game program during the
course of its reverse engineering efforts.177 However, to hold that
Accolade had copied “too much” would overlook the fact that until
Accolade had decompiled the entire program it could not know
whether it had all the information necessary to produce Genesis-compatible games. The object-coded representation of a computer program
produced by a decompiler lists program steps in the order in which
they are coded, not the order in which they are executed.178 For
example, a series of interoperability-related instructions performed
during the startup of a game program may be dispersed throughout the
program microcode, linked by “jump” commands that tell the
computer to skip to a different portion of the microcode.179 The reverse
engineer must decompile the entire program to locate those
instructions. Other interoperability-related instructions may be
performed while the game program is running, and those also may
proceed via “jump” commands. Once again, the reverse engineer cannot know whether all steps necessary for interoperability have been
located without checking the entire program. Thus, decompiling Sega's
entire program was not an indulgence, but a necessity.
Generally speaking, legal scholars have agreed that courts evaluating claimed fair uses should consider the amount and substantiality
of the copying in light of the nature of the use and the other statutory
factors.180 The foregoing analysis is consistent with this consensus.
The third statutory factor still weighs against the reverse engineer who
uses decompilation to discover interoperability requirements, but given
the other characteristics of that use, the fact that it entails copying the
entire program should not preclude a finding that the use is a fair one.
D. DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN MARKET
USURPATION AND LAWFUL COMPETITION
The Sega district court's analysis of the fourth statutory factor,
the effect of the unauthorized copying on the market for the
copied work,181 paralleled its analysis of the first. Judge Caulfield
read Harper & Row to establish a presumption that heavily favored the
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Sega, 977 F.2d at 1526.
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copyright owner, Sega.182
Again, the Ninth Circuit indicated that
fair use requires a more fact-specific approach, 183 and again, the AcuffRose Court later agreed.184 This time, however, Acuff-Rose does less to
dispel the prevailing confusion about how courts should evaluate the
market effects flowing from “commercial” uses.
Judge Caulfield relied on the Harper & Row Court's statement that
“[f]air use, when properly applied, is limited to copying by others
which does not materially impair the marketability of the work which
is copied.”185 Many fair use decisions by lower courts subsequent to
Harper & Row have read “materially” out of this test, finding challenged uses unfair if they would have any effect at all on the market for
the copyrighted work.186 Literally, of course, any use of a copyrighted
work has some effect on the market for that work. However, just as
section 107 does not require that every use with a commercial purpose
be found unfair, neither does it require that any market effect preclude
a finding of fair use. It merely instructs courts to consider that effect as
one factor among many.187 In particular, as the Supreme Court
recognized in Acuff-Rose, the fact that a work is used in a commercial
or for-profit setting does not create a presumption of market harm. 188
The question remains, as always, at what point—short of every use, or
every “commercial” use, of copyrighted material—to draw the line.
The Acuff-Rose Court distinguished between “potentially remediable displacement and unremediable disparagement” in the form of
criticism.189 Defendants' parody of the plaintiffs' copyrighted song fell
into the latter category, and was held potentially fair, pending further factfinding. In light of the high intellectual and First Amendment
values placed on criticism in all its forms, the Court's conclusion
seems unimpeachable. However, Acuff-Rose should not be read to
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indicate that every instance of “potentially remediable displacement” is
unfair: First, as a technical matter, that question was not before the
Court. Given the Court's express rejection of the Eleventh Circuit's
attempt to read Sony and Harper & Row as establishing bright-line
rules for separating fair from unfair uses, reading its remarks on displacement to create such a rule would amount to willful misunderstanding.190 Second and more important, the “transformative use”
criterion adopted by the Court implicitly broadens the category of
permissible uses. There are many conceivable commercial uses of a
work (including research and news reporting) that do not necessarily
constitute “disparagement” in the sense of parody or unfavorable criticism. Finally, as a matter of logic, the fact that a particular use is
“potentially remediable” cannot alone be grounds for a finding of unfairness; many fair use disputes have arisen precisely because a license
to use the work has been denied.191
The question left unresolved by Acuff-Rose, but directly addressed
in Sega, is: Under what circumstances is a use that occasions
displacement of the copyrighted work fair? The Sega court held that
analysis of market effect must include consideration of the extent to
which a given use simply enables a competitor to enter the market with
another work of the same type.192 For Professor Miller, that conclusion is tantamount to sanctioning piracy.193 However, as discussed
above, the connection between use of the copyrighted work and competition with the copyright owner is indirect.194 As the Sega court recognized, simple common sense dictates that the absolute rule applied
in Harper & Row, which involved a “scoop” of the heart of a copyrighted work that threatened to supplant the market for the work entirely, cannot logically be extended to works that are “the same” only
to the extent that both are compatible with the same computer operating system.195 To exclude those competitors from the market for that
reason would effectively protect not only the copyrighted work's expression, but the underlying ideas as well. Of course, allowing access
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to interoperability requirements affects the market for the copyrighted
work, because it facilitates increased competition in that market.
However, the purpose of copyright—to encourage the production and
distribution of creative works—is best served by allowing such
competition, not by blocking new market entrants.196
If a use that enables production of a competing product is unfair,
then the result of the fair use analysis would have been very different if
Accolade had simply decompiled Sega's operating system rather than
its games. In that case, disassembly would have resulted in the
development of a complementary product rather than a competing one.
Accolade's final product, however, would be the same, as would its
effect—whatever that may have been—on the market for Sega's
games. Moreover, as applied to computer programs, the term “displacement” may be misleading. As a result of the interdependence
among applications programs and operating systems, the consequences
of a “displacing” use are by no means one-sided. At the very least, it is
possible that the increased availability of compatible games translated
into increased sales of Sega's console, which in turn would translate
into increased demand for all Genesis-compatible games. If so, the
work created through copying complements and supplements the
original. This does not justify holding all such uses fair, but it is reason
enough to hold that not all such uses are unfair per se.197
For Professor Miller, the Sega court's emphasis on access to unprotected functional principles is, “at bottom…an argument for
standardization.”198 This conclusion mistakenly conflates two quite
different concepts. As at least one commentator has observed, there
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is a world of difference between removing legal barriers to compatibility and making system incompatibility illegal.199 While mandated
standardization would foreclose, or at least inhibit, the development of
new computing methods and operating systems, its polar opposite, the
complete absence of interoperability, also would prove detrimental to
innovation, and to consumers.200
Taken to extremes, complete
acompatibility would require consumers to buy a different computer
system—or, in the future, install a different set-top box—for each application desired. More realistically, selective licensing would make
available a limited number of preselected combinations of copyrighted
products, depriving consumers of the opportunity to mix and match
individual applications according to their individual tastes. Only two
parties will have the power to determine what combinations of
copyrighted applications will be made available: the manufacturer of
the uncopyrighted, and in most cases uncopyrightable, hardware
system, and (in the case of the set-top box) the telecommunications
provider. Although some manufacturers of computers and operating
systems release interoperability-related information, it has become
clear that others will not. The video game industry, which is immensely profitable, is simply the most egregious and the earliest example.201 Clearly, the effective monopoly over functional principles
that results from such a policy is not a situation anticipated by Congress or by the members of CONTU. However, given that copyright
does not protect functional features, such a monopoly cannot be what
Congress would have intended.202
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E. TOWARD AN OVEREACHING VISION OF FAIR USE
As the foregoing discussion makes clear, the controversy over
Sega's application of the fair use doctrine to the reverse engineering of
computer interoperability requirements concerns more than just a
narrow and highly technical subject. It is also a debate about the purposes of copyright protection and the role of the fair use defense within
the larger statutory scheme. The task of crafting copyright doctrines
that are responsive to the needs of new technologies, as well as to those
of more traditional forms of creative expression, cannot proceed
without a clear and shared understanding of what copyright protection
seeks to accomplish, and how the particular rule at issue furthers that
agenda.
Professor Fisher identifies four objectives of “copyright law in
general and the doctrine of fair use in particular” that emerge from
Sony and Harper & Row:
(a) advancing social utility by increasing the supply of intellectual
products and facilitating their distribution; (b) enforcing an author's
natural right to a reasonable portion of the fruits of his labor; (c)
protecting an author's interest in controlling the way in which his
creations are presented to the world; and (d) aligning the law with
203
custom and popular conceptions of decent behavior.

Certainly, to varying degrees all four are objectives of copyright law.
With respect to fair use in particular, however, the list is overinclusive.
A finding of fair use effects a contraction of the scope of copyright
protection. With each successful assertion of the defense, a use of a
copyrighted work that ordinarily would constitute infringement
entitling the copyright owner to redress is held, instead, to be lawful.204
The second and third objectives identified by Professor Fisher, in
contrast, are reasons for according copyright protection broader, not
narrower, scope. Natural rights justifications for copyright and
theories of “moral rights” or “artistic integrity”205 are not concerned
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with questions of larger social utility, in particular the increase in social utility that might result from allowing access to and limited fair
use of copyrighted works.206 Accordingly, natural rights concepts can
never be affirmative justifications for a finding of fair use. They are
important only in the negative sense, as reasons for declining to find
fair use in particular cases.207
The fourth objective, tailoring the scope of copyright protection to
custom or community standards of acceptable conduct, may favor
either expanding or contracting the scope of copyright protection, depending on the circumstances. Unlike natural rights and moral rights
theories, therefore, custom is a plausible underpinning for the fair use
doctrine. A community standards or “fairness” approach also is consistent with the fair use doctrine's equitable origin and intent.208 A
legislatively sanctioned element of “gut instinct” lies, at the core of
every fair use determination.209 Finally, to a significant degree, a fair
ness justification for fair use reflects reality. Professor Weinreb, in
particular, has shown that custom and community standards go a long
way toward explaining what judges actually do in fair use cases.210
However, recourse to community standards of fairness can resolve only those cases in which the community standard or “customary practice” invoked truly is a shared one and transcends the
particular commercial interests and agendas of those involved in the
case. Sega is a case in point. In some sectors of the computer programming industry, reverse engineering is an accepted method of innovation and competition. In others, it is viewed as barely one step
above industrial espionage.211 In general, at least in this country, the
smaller software companies are of the former persuasion, while the
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larger, established manufacturers of hardware and operating systems—
those with the strongest interest in keeping operating systems
proprietary—espouse the latter.212 Had the Ninth Circuit attempted to
resolve Sega based solely on the parties' representations as to accepted
practice, its task would have been impossible. Moreover, a choice
between values advanced by competing business lobbies smacks of
mere politics, and lacks legitimacy. If considerations of accepted
practice are the primary factor motivating judicial decisionmaking in
the area of fair use, the results may be perceived as unprincipled and,
to both authors and would-be infringers, readily manipulated. In cases
where a real, widely shared consensus exists, that consensus can assist
judges in evaluating claims of fair use.213 In cases where
representations regarding accepted practice simply reflect the
commercial agendas of the parties, notions of custom and fair play
cannot supply enduring and principled rules for determining when the
boundaries of copyright protection should contract.
Of the four objectives of the copyright laws identified by Professor
Fisher, only the first—increasing the supply of creative works and
facilitating their distribution to the public—remains as a potentially
viable unifying justification for fair use. In a very real sense, therefore,
the debate over fair use reduces to a debate over how this goal is best
achieved.214 As a threshold matter, we must consider whether
protecting authors' exclusive rights does not in itself accomplish this
goal. Clearly, it does—that is the rationale for according authors
copyright protection in the first place.215 However, the existence of
the fair use privilege reflects an implicit consensus that protecting authors' rights to the hilt is not always enough to ensure adequate supply
and distribution of creative works. If it were, the scope of copyright
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protection with the fair use doctrine would be coextensive with the
scope of copyright protection without it.
Thus, the fair use doctrine represents a determination that affirmative measures to increase the supply and distribution of creative works
may occasionally be necessary. The forms taken by these exceptions to
the general rules governing infringement will depend on how “supply”
and “distribution” are conceived. As discussed above, commentators
differ as to whether the Copyright Act (and the Copyright Clause) were
intended only to secure the widespread availability of creative works to
the public or also to secure access to the expressive and nonexpressive
building blocks used to create them.216 I have argued that particularly
in the case of computer programs, access and public availability are
inseparably related. If interoperability-related information is denied to
programmers, the flow of new creative works into the market may
slow to a trickle. Fair use thus must promote access to creative works
as well as their distribution for public consumption.
The “transformative use” criterion developed by Judge Leval and
adopted by the Acuff-Rose Court serves this dual purpose, for it rewards the use of copyrighted works as raw material in the creative 217
process. However, I have argued for a broader conception of fair use
than either Judge Leval or the Acuff-Rose Court recognized. It appears
that Judge Leval would not privilege an “enabling use” aimed only at
understanding a work unless that use could be directly traced to the
production of a new creative work.218 Yet, section 107's enumeration
of teaching and research as presumptively fair uses suggests that
exploration alone, without more, may be fair, and that interpretation
makes sense.219 Privileging the acquisition of knowledge, even without
a close temporal connection to new expression, creates a society in
which authors and the creative process can flourish. 220 New creative
output, however remote in time, still must meet the standard
for noninfringement.
Fear of hypothetical future infringement cannot
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justify limiting access to the information and expression contained in
existing works.
Of course, fair use should privilege enabling uses only to the extent
that it does not thereby undermine the other objectives of the copyright
law so greatly that it produces a net disincentive to create and
disseminate new works.221 Once again, this is a slippery standard. As a
matter of logic, whenever the fairness of a particular use is disputed, it
is likely that a finding of fair use will undermine at least one of the
other goals to some degree. If fair use is to have any scope at all, there
must be occasions when the other goals of copyright should give way,
but it is important as well to identify those occasions when they should
not. Although fair use is inherently irreducible to general rules, certain
broad parameters suggest themselves.
First, the use should not offend fundamental, universally shared
community standards regarding commercial fair play. In contrast,
community standards of fairness should play a lesser role when there is
significant, pervasive disagreement—or no widespread public opinion
at all—on the commercial fairness of the use.222
Second, to be fair, a use should not strike at the core of the author’s
“natural right to a reasonable portion of the fruits of his labor.”223
Thus, for example, an incorporation of any of an author’s creative
expression into a final product should not constitute an attempt to
appropriate the heart of the original work and supplant market demand
for that work. However, as the debate over decompilation and
interoperability demonstrates, the same rule should not extend to a use
of creative material that enables creation of a new work that simply
competes with the original in the market for works of its type. In
particular, where copying is necessary to gain access to and
understanding of the ideas and principles embodied in a work, copying
solely to gain understanding should be deemed fair use.
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III. ARE COPYRIGHT AND INTEROPERABILITY
COMPATIBLE?
The Sega court’s decision to sanction decompilation was based on
its belief that the program attributes that dictate interoperability
requirements are functional features that copyright does not protect and
that reverse engineers have a right to copy. 224 It follows that the
freedom to decompile established in Sega must be accompanied by the
right to produce a final product compatible with the desired computer
system. The same principles and policies govern both inquiries. At
each stage, the court must weigh considerations of functionality, public
access, and creatorship. The balances reached, and the incentives that
result, should be consistent. It makes little sense to allow intermediate
copying where necessary to understand the requirements for
interoperability, only to withhold permission to incorporate the copied
work’s functional features to the extent necessary to make the reverse
engineered produce interoperable. Both types of conduct should be
allowed, or disallowed, to the same extent and in the same manner.225
What, then, to make of Sega and Atari? Are they consistent—as I
have defined that term—with each other and with the language and
overall purpose of the copyright laws? They are not. Atari’s
misconduct aside, the result of the copyright inquiry in Atari should
have been no different from that in Sega. The same principles that
dictated that Accolade be allowed to disassemble Sega’s programs also
dictated that Atari be allowed to design a program that incorporated all
of the functional characteristics of the 10NES. Instead, the Atari court
relied too heavily on doctrinal formulations developed for analyzing
traditional literary works, and in doing so lost sight of exactly which
aspects of computer programs copyright does not protect. This part
explores the application of the “idea-expression” distinction and its
offshoots, the doctrines of merger and scènes à faire, to lock-out
routines and other interoperability-related features of computer
programs.
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A. COMPUTER PROGRAMS AND THE
“IDEA - EXPRESSION” DISTINCTION
Whether the Copyright Act permits duplication of the functional
features necessary for interoperability has been said to depend on
where the boundary between protected expression and unprotected idea
is drawn.226 The location of the boundary between protectable and
unprotectable subject matter is, of course, the central project of
copyright. Drawn too narrowly, copyright protection will provide insufficient incentives to invest creative effort; drawn too broadly, copyright in existing works may impoverish future creative efforts.227 Lost
in the formulation of the boundary-drawing project as an idea-expression distinction, however, is the fact that copyright also does not protect systems, processes, procedures, or methods of operation—much
more relevant and analytically useful concepts in the computer programming context .228 In part because of the idea-expression formulation, early cases concerning the scope of copyright protection for
computer programs swept too much within copyright's scope. Recent
decisions have begun to correct that imbalance. However, considerable
uncertainty remains among courts as to which program elements
copyright protects, and how to approach the tasks of describing and
identifying them.
At first, beginning with Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental
Laboratory, Inc.,229 courts defined originality in computer programming largely without reference to external constraints. The “idea” of a
program was defined with reference to the program as a whole, such
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See, e.g., Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 703-06 (2d Cir.
1992); Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222,1236 (3d Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987). Copyright does not protect ideas, but only original
expression. See 17 U.S.C. ' 102; Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340,
345-46 (1991).
227
A too-expansive conception of copyright protection jeopardizes future creative efforts
by removing from the public domain material on which those works might otherwise be based.
See Feist, 499 U.S. at 345-50. The recognition that copyright seeks a middle ground has deep
roots in Anglo-American law. More than two hundred years ago, Lord Manfield observed that
Awe must take care to guard against two extremes equally prejudicial; the one, that men of
abilityYmay not be deprived of their just merits, and the reward for their ingenuity and labour
the other, that the world may not be deprived of improvements, nor the progress of the arts be
retarded.@ Sayre v. Moore, 102 Eng. Rep. 138, 140 n.6 (1785).
228
17 U.S.C. ' 102(b); see Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879); Samuelson, Critique of
Paperback, supra note 16; Pamela Samuelson, The Nature of Copyright Analysis for Computer
Programs. Copyright Law Professors' Brief Amicus Curiae in Lotus v. Borland, 16 HASTINGS
COMM . & ENT . LJ. 657 (1994) [hereinafter Samuelson, Nature of Copyright).
229
797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
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as, for example, the idea of a word processing program. 230 Most
industry commentators and legal scholars argued that efficiency
considerations and interoperability requirements, properly understood,
operate as functional constraints, and that program subroutines or
processes designed to satisfy those constraints therefore should not be
considered part of the programmer's creative expression. 231 However,
although subsequent courts criticized or rejected various aspects of
Whelan, few questioned its basic premise that the creative content of a
computer program could be assessed without looking beyond the program itself,232 and none undertook a major reformulation of the Whelan court's approach to evaluating the “substantial similarity” of
nonliteral program elements.233
Not until May 1992, less than two months before oral argument in
Sega, did a federal appellate court systematically attempt to dismantle
and replace the Whelan paradigm. In Computer Associates International, Inc. v. Altai, Inc.,234 the Second Circuit held that program
features dictated by efficiency or interoperability constraints must be
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Id. at 1236 (A[T]he purpose or function of a utilitarian work would be the work's idea,
and everything that is not necessary to that purpose or function would be part of the expression
of the idea.@ (emphasis omitted)). But see Plains Cotton Coop. Assn. of Lubbock v. Goodpasture Computer Serv., Inc., 807 F.2d 1256, 1262 (5th Cir.) (holding that program elements dictated by external constraints imposed by Amarket factors@ may Aconstitute 'ideas' in a computer
context @), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 821 (1987). Although later Fifth Circuit decisions have
declined to read Plains Cotton broadly enough to deny copyright protection to all Anonliteral@
aspects of computer programs, they have reaffirmed its rejection of Whelan as to program
elements dictated by external constraints. See Kepner-Tregoe, Inc. v. Leadership Software,
Inc., 12 F.3d 527, 536 n.20 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 82 (1994); Engineering
Dynamics, Inc. v. Structural Software, Inc., 26 F.3d 1335, 1346-47 (5th Cir. 1994) (remanding,
pursuant to Plains Cotton, for consideration of whether industry standards dictated program
input and output formats), modified, 46 F.3d 408 (5th Cir. 1995).
231
See, e.g., Kajala, New Protectionism, supra note 6, at 64-66; Menell, Tailoring Legal
Protection, supra note 8, at 1361-63; Chisum et al., LaST Fronder Conference Report, supra
note 77, at 20-21.
232
In Plains Cotton, the Fifth Circuit recognized that conventions followed within an industry can significantly constrain a programmer's creative options, but did not address
interoperability-related issues. Plains Cotton, 807 F.2d at 1262. The Ninth Circuit and two
district courts acknowledged existence and effect of interoperability constraints, but did not
address other limi tations. See Data East USA, Inc. v. Epyx, Inc., 862 F.2d 204 (9th Cir. 1988);
Manufacturers Technologies, Inc. v. Cams, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 984 (D. Conn. 1989); Q-Co
Indus., Inc. v. Hoffman, 625 F. Supp. 608 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
233
The Ninth and Fifth Circuits, which never adopted Whelan, also never made any attempts to develop a more compelling paradigm that might persuade other circuits to abandon
it. See infra text accompanying notes 252-55.
234
982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
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“filtered” out of the substantial similarity analysis in software
infringement cases.235 In so holding, it became the first appellate
court to treat computer programs as fundamentally interdependent
and highly utilitarian works, with at least some features driven by
functional constraints rather than creative choice.236
Professor
Miller has suggested that Altai's “abstraction-filtration-comparison”
test does not constitute a philosophical departure from Whelan,
but merely fleshes out issues identified in Whelan.237 As discussed
below, Altai, like Whelan, framed the problem as one of
demarcating “idea”—as opposed to “system” or “process”—from
“expression.”238 However, one may search Whelan in vain for
any recognition that a computer program is dependent, to a degree,
upon the functional constraints imposed
by
its
operating
environment. Under Whelan, every program element is presumptively
protected by copyright to the extent that it conveys information—
which, of course, is what program elements do.239 As a result of
this
inclusive
approach, comparison of the challenged and
copyrighted works sweeps broadly, encompassing program elements
that are substantially similar by necessity rather than by design. In

235

See id. at 707-10. Drawing on Professor Nimmer's treatise, the Altai court set forth a
three-part Aabstraction-filtration-comparison@ test for the analysis of allegedly infringing computer programs. Id. at 706-11 (citing, inter alia, 3 M ELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER,
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT ' 13.03 (1991)). As the first step, the structure of the program is analyzed at different levels of abstraction. Altai, 982 F.2d at 706-07. AOnce the program's abstraction levels have been discovered, the substantial similarity inquiry moves from the conceptual
to the concrete.@ Id. at 707. At each level of abstraction, unprotectable material—that is,
material dictated by efficiency, industry demands, or interoperability requirements—is filtered
out, leaving an identifiable “‘core of protectable material.’” Id. (quoting NIMMER & NIMMER,
supra, ' 13.03[F][51, at 13-72). Finally, the challenged program and the copyrighted program
are compared to determine whether any of this protectable core has been copied. Altai, 982
F.2d at 71011.
236
Based on surveys of programmers, Anthony Clapes has argued that the Afunctional
constraints@ argument is a myth. See, e.g., Clapes, supra note 163, at 926-28 & n.100; Symposium, Copyright Protection: Has Look and Feel Crashed?, 11 CARDOZO AR T S & ENT . L.J.
721, 746-50 (1993) (remarks of Mr. Clapes). I suspect that, like the blind men who disagreed
about the elephant's shape, the programmers who emphasize creativity and those who
emphasize constraint are focusing on different program features. Certainly it is no myth that
the chosen operating environment for a program imposes constraints that must be met if the
program is to function at all.
237
See Miller, supra note 16, at 1001-02, 1006-10. In the narrowest sense, this is true.
The defendant in Whelan essentially translated many aspects of the copyrighted program into a
different progranuning language. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1226. Thus, even applying the AltaiAabstraction-filtration-comparison@ test, the result in Whelan might have been the same. But it was
not the result in Whelan that software experts and legal scholars found untenable so much as
the broad rule that a program could have only one Aidea@ or unprotected aspect.
238
See infra text accompanying notes 273-77.
239
Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1243.

1139
contrast, under Altai, it is presumed that many elements of a copyrighted program will not be protected because although they convey
information, they do so in a way that is necessary to the operation of
the program and cannot be expressed in a substantially different manner; “filtration” of these elements must precede any comparison of the
challenged work.240 The upshot is that the comparisons undertaken by
Altai and Whelan are materially different. The inclusion of inevitably
similar unprotected elements cannot help but affect the degree of
perceived similarity between the copyrighted program and the
allegedly infringing one.241
Drawing once again on an analogy to traditional literary works,
Professor Miller cautions against reading Altai to require only thin
copyright protection for nonliteral program elements. He notes that
“the mere fact that the expression is efficient should not, without more,
bar protection for original authorship in the programming context any
more than it does in prose works. An uncritical application of Altai's
language would penalize the most effective (and in some senses the
most artistic) programmers.”242 As an initial matter, Altai did not hold
that efficient programs would be unprotected, but only that sequences
dictated by considerations of efficiency might be.243 The two concepts
are quite different. For example, a program routine for calling a lookup
table during a complex calculation is a sequence dictated by
considerations of efficiency that might be unprotected under Altai.
Lookup tables are the prevailing industry method for performing
complex calculations quickly with minimum memory, and there are
only so many ways for a program to call one.244 In contrast, a relational
database might be an efficient solution to the problem of storing and
retrieving data pertaining to bank loans, but that does not mean that
relational database programs are not protected by copyright. There are
a number of different ways to write such programs, and several leading
programs are available for purchase.245
More important, the Copyright Act does not protect efficiency per
se. It protects “original expression,” a term of art that refers to
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Altai, 982 F.2d at 707, 710.
See Clapes, supra note 163, at 920-21 (criticizing Altai for this reason).
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Miller, supra note 16, at 1004-05.
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Altai, 982 F.2d at 708-09.
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See generally Stem, supra note 16, at 382 (discussing the value of lookup tables for
performing complex calculations).
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See, e.g., Yael Li-Ron & John Montgomery, Double-Duty Databases, PC
COMPUTING , Mar. 1995, at 146; Kim S. Nash, Informix Fights Also-Ran Image.
COMPUTERWORLD , Mar. 20, 1995, at 1.
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the particular instantiation given to an idea or theme.246 That instantiation may be efficient, but efficiency is not synonymous with originality, and the expression as a whole may be efficient and original for
different reasons. An effective surgeon may be considered an artist
within the medical profession, but the procedures the surgeon has developed and perfected are not protected by copyright. If the procedures
are novel enough, they may qualify for patent protection; otherwise,
they belong in the public domain—even if the surgeon writes a book
about them that details how they are to be performed.247 The fact that
other surgeons may describe the procedures as “creative” or “elegant”
is beside the point. In the copyright context, those words are terms of
art, and section 102(b) of the Act makes clear that they do not apply to
systems, procedures, or routines.248
In other cases, a programmer may be efficient, in the sense of
getting a task done, without being at all creative, if the most efficient
way to perform the various steps needed to complete the task is well known and standard within the industry. The fact that the programmer
accomplishes the task by writing should not occasion a quantum leap
in the level of protection afforded the work. Here again, the treatment
of computer programs as literary works obscures the issue; to the
extent that industry-standard efficient routines are comparable to
literary works at all, they are comparable to the alphabetical arrangement of entries in a telephone directory or dictionary, a convention so commonplace that it has been held uncopyrightable as a matter
of law.249 If the programmer incorporates some idiosyncratic features
into the efficient routine, copyright may protect those features, but not
the routine itself. Even if the efficient routine is what gives the
program its commercial value, copyright does not permit the
programmer to complain when the routine is duplicated.250
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See 17 U.S.C. ' 102(a) (ACopyright protection subsistsYin original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.@).
247
This is exactly the scenario proposed, and rejected, in Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99
(1879). The description of a system or procedure may be protected if sufficiently original, but
the system or procedure itself may not be.
248
See 17 U.S.C. 11 102(b); Karjala, Computer Documents, supra note 6, at 997-98 &
nn.66, 67. Thus, the argument that programmers view their creations as Acreative@ misses the
point. See Clapes et al., supra note 16, at 1510-11.
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Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340,356-57 (1991) (holding
that the telephone white pages lack the constitutionally required minimum originality).
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As the Court explained in Feist, free riding may not be used to bootstrap an infringement claim. Id. at 349-50, 357.
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The Sega court invoked Altai as a prelude to its fair use analysis,
and listed as unprotected program elements those “dictated by the
function to be performed, by considerations of efficiency, or by external factors such as compatibility requirements and industry demands.”251 For the Sega court, however, approval of the Altai approach
was almost a foregone conclusion. The Ninth Circuit, which as the
“Silicon Valley court” has assumed a central role in the evolution of
computer copyright law, had never adopted Whelan, although that fact
went largely unnoticed in the academic community. Instead, in
previous computer program copyright cases, the court had applied the
idiosyncratic “intrinsic-extrinsic” test it had developed for evaluating
similarity of all types of challenged and copyrighted works.252 In
Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp,253 decided several months
before Altai, the Ninth Circuit explained that the first, or “extrinsic,”
part of the test requires “analytic dissection” of the copyrighted work
to identify the core of protectable expression. 254 In Altai, the Second
Circuit relied on Brown Bag to support its “filtration” and
“comparison” steps.255 Thus, although Sega was a literal copying case,
not a substantial similarity case, and although the Sega court did not
cite Brown Bag to support its approval of Altai, Altai was wholly
consistent with Ninth Circuit law.
Although the Third Circuit (the Whelan court) has yet to comment
on Altai, every other court to consider the issue has endorsed at
least some aspects of the Altai approach to substantial similarity.256
In the formal sense, Whelan has become a whipping boy, the artifact of
an earlier, less technologically sophisticated era. However, that does
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Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1524 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992)), as amended, 1993 U.S.
App. LEXIS 78 (9th Cir. 1993).
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See Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp., 960 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 198 (1992); Data East USA, Inc. v. Epyx, Inc., 862 F.2d 204 (9th Cir. 1988); Sid &
Marty Krofft Television Prod., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977).
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960 F.2d 1465.
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Id. at 1475-76.
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Altai, 982 F.2d at 707, 710.
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See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435,1445 (9th Cir. 1994);
Engineering Dynamics, Inc. v. Structural Software, Inc., 26 F.3d 1335,1341-43 (5th Cir. 1994),
modified, 46 F.3d 408, 409 (5th Cir. 1995); Kepner-Tregoe, Inc. v. Leadership Software, Inc.,
12 F.3d 527 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 82 (1994); Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem.
Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823 (10th Cir. 1993); Autoskill, Inc. v. National Educ. Support Sys., Inc.,
994 F.2d 1476 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 307 (1993); Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade,
Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1524 (9th Cir. 1992), as amended, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 78 (9th Cir.
1993); MiTek Holdings, Inc. v. Arce Eng'g Co., Inc., 864 F. Supp, 1568, 1577-79 (S.D. Fla.
1994); Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 203, 211-17 (D. Mass. 1992).
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not necessarily reflect a new unanimity on the question of how to determine which features of a computer program constitute protected
expression. To the contrary, the application of Altai's abstraction-filtration-comparison test has proved extremely malleable. As a recent
district court decision (now reversed) from the Tenth Circuit illustrates,
it is possible to craft a test that, though derived from Altai, nonetheless
looks suspiciously like Whelan.
In Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando American, Inc.,257 which involved
two computer programs for calculating the dimensions and capacities
of industrial belts, a Colorado district court attempted to apply a version of the Altai test. Relying on expert testimony, the court compared the programs and found them substantially similar in many
respects.258 It then applied what it termed the “abstractions” test to
determine whether the similarities were excused, and found that many
were not.259 Like the Whelan approach, the court's analysis put the
cart before the horse, with predictable result. Because the two programs contained common errors and there was evidence of deliberate
copying, the outcome—a judgment of infringement—probably was
warranted.260
However, the court also found infringement in the use
of mathematical constants necessary for performing the calculations,
and in the engineering modules that performed those calculations using
published formulas.261 It rejected Bando's argument that the formulas
and constants could be protected, if at all, only under patent laws, on
the ground that “[s]uch a holding would tend to fragment further the
rather tenuous continuity found in copyright law concerning computer
programs.”262 But on that point Bando, copier though it was, was
absolutely right; copyright does not protect formulae or processes.263
Fear of discontinuity is insufficient reason to ignore the plain
language of the Copyright Act and is ultimately beside the point;
discontinuity is inherent in the statutorily mandated task of separating
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798 F. Supp. 1499 (D. Colo. 1992), affd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823 (10th Cir. 1993).
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Id. at 1514-16.
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Id. at 1516-18.
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Johnson-Laird suggests that common errors should not necessarily be read to denote
theft of protectable expression. Johnson-Laird, supra note 12, at 900. Certainly, the question
whether a reverse engineer has duplicated an error of logical function should be separated from
whether the engineer has taken protected expression. The prevalence and significance of common errors may, however, be relevant to that determination.
261
Gates Rubber, 798 F. Supp. at 1518.
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Id. at 1518 (citing Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d
1222,1229 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987)).
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17 U.S.C. ' 102(b).
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protected expression from unprotectable ideas and processes, and in
the constitutionally mandated separation of subject matter protected by
copyright from subject matter protected by patent. The Tenth Circuit
reversed, and directed the lower court to reevaluate the two programs
after filtering out unprotected matter.264 However, the district court's
opinion demonstrates that a mandate to conduct “filtration” is useless
without an understanding of what elements must be filtered out, and
why.
It is still too early to determine with precision Altai's impact. It is
certain that after Altai, however broadly or narrowly applied, the universe of protected programming elements has shrunk, while that of
unprotected elements has expanded. In individual cases, however, the
basis for distinguishing between creative and functional programming
elements is imperfectly defined, as Gates Rubber illustrates. Without
question, some of this imprecision is inherent in the test itself, however
formulated. As Judge Learned Hand concluded over sixty years ago,
“[n]obody has ever been able to fix that boundary, and nobody ever
can.”265 For software engineers concerned with creating interoperable
programs, however, pinpointing the location of that boundary is of
critical importance, and a matter of commercial survival. And some of
the uncertainty regarding which program elements are subject to
filtration is neither necessary nor desirable. We turn now to Atari and
the interoperability question, and attempt to develop a clearer test.
B. PROCESS- EXPRESSION AND INTEROPERABILITY:
A FUNCTIONALITY- BASED APPROACH
Technically, the Atari court did not hold that Atari was barred from
duplicating the features of the 10NES that were necessary for
interoperability with the NES console; in light of Sega, it could not.266
The court simply held that Atari had duplicated more than was required to achieve that goal. However, what Atari had duplicated too
much of, according to the court, was functionality. The court was
unpersuaded by Atari's contention that the functionality in question
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would materially affect interoperability with future versions of the
NES.267 Essentially, Atari stands for the proposition that “surplus”
functionality at the program-to-program interface—functionality not
needed for current compatibility with the target system—constitutes
protectable, and protected, expression. In light of the fact that the
Copyright Act does not protect functionality at all, that result seems
curious.268 This section considers how the court came to reach it, and
how the idea-expression distinction both illumines and obscures copyright issues relating to interoperability.
Before Altai, the only significant appellate decision that dealt with
the question of copying to achieve interoperability was Apple
Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp,269 decided three years
before Whelan. Franklin Computer copied Apple's operating system so
its own computers would support Apple-compatible applications
programs. To justify the copying, Franklin argued, among other things,
that the idea of a computer operating system merged with its
expression because of the multitude of functional constraints imposed
by existing applications programs.270 Finding Apple's operating system
protected and infringed by Franklin's verbatim copying, the court
observed: “Franklin may wish to achieve total compatibility with independently developed application programs written for the Apple II, but
that is a commercial and competitive objective which does not enter
into the somewhat metaphysical issue of whether particular ideas and
expressions have merged.”271 Altai represents a major reassessment of
that view.272
In Altai, the Second Circuit clearly and unambiguously held that
interoperability-related features must be filtered out of the substantial
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Id. at 1423-24. See supra text accompanying notes 66-67.
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272
The Altai court did not cite the Franklin Computer dictum, Paperback, or Secure
Services in its discussion of compatibility. Franklin Computer involved verbatim copying and
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268
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similarity analysis.273 However, the court reached that conclusion in a
fashion that should have struck industry observers as nothing short of
bizarre. It invoked the doctrine of scènes à faire, a rule developed to
aid in the substantial similarity analysis of fictional and theatrical
works. Under the scènes à faire doctrine, “standard” literary elements
or devices are not copyrightable if they are viewed as virtually
indispensable to a literary treatment of the subject matter.274 The Altai
court reasoned that interoperability-related features are indispensable
to a program written for a particular computing environment, and so
should be treated as scènes à faire for purposes of copyright.275
The analogy between interoperability-related routines and “stock”
literary devices is-rather far-fetched. The two types of expression serve
very different conceptions of necessity, and are valued for different
reasons. Stock literary devices function as a sort of shorthand for the
communication of perceived cultural truths; they are deemed
“necessary” because they greatly facilitate audience recognition of a
particular cultural or historical milieu.276 The value of scènes à faire
lies in the particular expressions of the ideas that they represent. It is
entirely conceivable that a work that omitted them might nonetheless
be extremely effective. Interoperability-related routines, in contrast, are
necessary in the most literal sense possible: Without them, the program
will not function. Such routines are valued, in short, not for the
expression they contain, but for the result they produce.
Although the Altai court set forth a rigorous, systematic method for
identifying and excluding interoperability-related program elements,
the test it devised does not appear to be rooted in a firm understanding
of why those elements are unprotectable in the first place. The reason
is deceptively simple. Program elements necessary for interoperability
with another computer program are unprotectable not because they
represent “ideas,” but because they are systems, procedures, or
methods of operation—in short, functional things—and so, under
section 102(b) of the Copyright Act, unprotectable just as ideas
are unprotectable.277 The Copyright Act does not prohibit, but rather
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expressly allows, the creation of an exact functional analogue of a
copyrighted utilitarian work. To take a well-known example, the lamp
in Mazer v. Stein,278 the copyright protected only the design of the
lamp base. It did not protect the lighting mechanism, or the on-off
switch, or the method of using a lampshade to reduce glare.
Atari is proof that the “why” of unprotectability matters. The
“surplus” functions in the 10NES program did not become expression
by virtue of their surplusage. They were designed to perform particular
functions at the interface between console and cartridge, whether or
not those functions were necessary in the sense of scènes à faire to
unlock a particular version of the NES. There is no reason that a
competing program that merely duplicated those functions—not the
programming sequences by which they were expressed—should be
deemed to contain expression substantially similar to the original. In a
sense, Atari's characterization of the issue as a question of present
versus future interoperability, with the attendant emphasis on
competitive positioning, was a tactical error that confused the court.
Atari argued that if copyright permitted only duplication of those
functional features that were currently necessary for interoperability,
Nintendo would be free to reprogram the NES master chip to look for
other functional features of the slave chip, thereby freezing out all of
Atari's previously released products with each new release of the NES
console.279 However, nothing in the Copyright Act prohibits a
copyright owner from altering the expression in its copyrighted work
to gain a competitive advantage. Copying to achieve future
interoperability is entirely consistent with the language and purpose of
the Copyright Act, not because an applications developer has any
suprastatutory right to preempt changes in another's proprietary
technology, but because all functionality at the interface between
computer programs is unprotectable ex ante.280
Here it is worth returning, briefly, to the Franklin Computer
problem. Franklin Computer involved the opposite situation from
Sega and Atari. Accolade and Atari produced game programs that
were compatible with their competitors’ operating systems; Franklin
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sought to create an operating system that would support applications
originally developed for Apple’s operating system. Under Altai’s
scènes à faire approach to interoperability, as applied in Atari, Franklin
would have no right to do so, because the interoperability-related
routines necessary to run a particular application could not be
considered virtually indispensable to any functioning operating system.
Under a functionality-based approach to interoperability, the out come
is quite different. An operating system that duplicates the systems and
procedures necessary to run particular preexisting applications does not
infringe. Although that rule still would not excuse Franklin's outright
copying of Apple's entire operating system, Franklin could not be
barred from designing its own operating system that provided the
required functional base for Apple II-compatible programs.281
Nor does the doctrine of merger afford sufficient basis for
determining the degree to which interoperability-related program
features should be excluded from the substantial similarity analysis.
Like scènes à faire, merger is a tool for identifying instances in which
expression otherwise protectable by copyright is not protected. As the
name implies, merger excuses copying when the expression taken is
the only way, or one of a very few ways, to convey the underlying
idea.282 The merger doctrine does not tell us how to identify those
aspects of a copyrighted work that are ineligible for copyright protecion in the first instance. The Atari court understood the limited role
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The interesting question raised by the Franklin Computer situation is whether
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that merger plays in the analysis of utilitarian works.283 However,
several courts that have subsequently considered the Altai test have
not. The Fifth and Tenth Circuits, in applying Altai's “filtration” step to
computerized diagnostic and training systems, found the categories and
subcategories within each system to be protectable expression because
there were other ways to design diagnostic and training Systems.284
Both ignored the fact that the Copyright Act expressly excludes
systems from the subject matter it protects, regardless of whether or
not other possible systems exist.285
Judge Keeton's much publicized “Key Reader” opinion in Lotus
Development Corp. v. Borland International, Inc.,286 recently reversed
by the First Circuit, illustrates the consequences of confusing the
doctrine of idea-expression merger with more fundamental principles
that govern copyrightability. The “Key Reader” dispute in Borland
involved two spreadsheet programs, Lotus 1-2-3 and Borland's Quattro
Pro. Key Reader, a module of Quattro Pro, was designed to read and
execute users’ short programs, or “macros,” written using the Lotus 12-3 command hierarchy. To that end, it duplicated the Lotus command
structure, including the first letters of the commands.287 Judge Keeton
likened the arrangement of commands chosen by Lotus to the
arrangement of facts in a compilation, in which the organizing
principle may be protected if sufficiently creative—in other words, if it
is one of many possible organizing principles, and so does not merge
with the underlying information.288 Relying on his earlier rulings in
the Borland dispute289 and in Lotus Development Corp. v. Paperback
Software International290 that the Lotus 1-2-3 menu structure was only
one of many possible ways to organize spreadsheet commands, he
characterized the organization of the command hierarchy as protected
expression. 291
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In support of this reasoning, Judge Keeton observed only that a
novel could be characterized as a system for communicating ideas, and
that “the ability to describe a work as a ‘system’ is not decisive of
whether the work is a ‘system,’ or instead is protected expression,
under copyright law.”292 Of course, the same is true of the ability to
describe a utilitarian work as an exercise in the arrangement of facts
and ideas. The fact that metaphor may part company with reality does
not excuse inability (or refusal) to tell the difference.293 Given the
division between copyrightable and uncopyrightable subject matter set
forth in section 102(b) of the Copyright Act, the fact that it is possible
to describe a novel as a system for communicating ideas and the fact
that it is possible to describe a computer program as a compilation of
information are equally irrelevant.294
The First Circuit's opinion recognizes the lesson of Baker v. Selden, codified in section 102(b), that a system is not copyrightable subject matter, and that its designer may not invoke the copyright laws to
prevent others from practicing it even if other possible systems exist.295 Only the expression of a system, method, or procedure implicates the copyright laws, and then only to the extent that there are
many possible methods of expression, rather than just a few.296 At
that point doctrines such as merger and scènes à faire become relevant.
Another well-known example, the jeweled bee pin in Herbert
Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian,297 illustrates this distinction.
The issue in Kalpakian was whether the defendant's bee pin duplicated
protected expression in the plaintiff's pin, or only expression that was
necessary to the idea of a bee. In contrast, interoperability concerns
infrastructure, not appearance. Kalpakian would be analogous to
Atari or to Borland if the jeweler had sued its competitor for using
a pin to attach its bee to the wearer's clothing. Had it done so, it
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would have been laughed out of court. The result for a party who
attempts to bar others from practicing a system that happens to be
embodied in a computer program should be no different.
It is worth noting that using the merger doctrine to identify
unprotected program elements also risks erring too far on the side of
underprotection. If interoperability may be defined as an idea with
which particular program routines are deemed to have merged,298
there is no reason that any other functional attribute of a program may
not be similarly characterized. Taken to its logical extreme, that
approach could sanction outright copying of all arguably functional
program features.299 Sega and Atari illustrate the shortcomings of this
approach to interoperability.
The security system used by Sega was relatively simple: a twenty
to twenty-five byte “header file” containing object-coded
representations of the letters S-E-G-A.300 Strictly speaking, Accolade's
decision to incorporate the header file into its final product was not at
issue in the appeal because Sega challenged only Accolade's
intermediate copying.301 However, Sega specifically argued that
Accolade's duplication of its header file was not a fair use.302 The
Ninth Circuit rejected this suggestion. Among other reasons, the court
noted that the sequence was “probably unprotected under the words
and short phrases doctrine.”303 Even from a strict protectionist
perspective, the court's conclusion seems unimpeachable. There is only
one way to express the “S-E-G-A” sequence in object-coded
representations of ASCII characters. Accordingly, even though the
letters spelled Sega's name, copying them could not take protected
expression from Sega. In copyright parlance, the idea—the name
“Sega”—and its expression had merged. In that respect, Sega was not a
difficult case.
The difficulty with holding that the merger doctrine excuses
copying of all interoperability-related features arises in cases like Atari
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when more complex code sequences are at issue. Nintendo's 10NES
program was considerably more complex than the Sega header file.304
Accordingly, in an attempt to avoid infringing the expressive elements
of the 10NES, Atari devised new programming sequences that would
generate the same results as the 10NES at the required points in
time.305 The result was the “Rabbit” program, which Nintendo acknowledged was not a literal copy. 306 If the object-coded version of the
10NES embodied a complete merger of idea and expression, Atari
could simply have copied it, just as Accolade copied Sega's header file.
As applied to Atari, however, that approach is flawed. As I have
explained, “merger” is not simply a term employed to register the
presence of unprotectable functional or utilitarian matter. In the
copyright context, it has a specific, technical meaning. For idea and
expression to merge, there must be only one or a few means of
expression available to the author, so that no real choice exists as to the
manner of the expression.307 That is true of many, but not all, functions
that an operating system, or any computer program, performs. Atari's
Rabbit program demonstrated that there were a number of ways to
produce the mathematical results required by the 10NES. A simpler,
and sounder, statement of the right to create a compatible program is
that the reverse engineer may duplicate systems or procedures
necessary for interoperability, because copyright does not protect
them.308
As applied to the 10NES program, or to any other complex
program element, the use of the merger doctrine to justify duplication
of interoperability-related program elements simply resurrects the
reductionist fallacy of Whelan. Under Whelan, all was expression, no
matter how utilitarian. If the merger doctrine is construed broadly to
excuse copying of literal code whenever that code is “functional,” all is
utilitarian, no matter how expressive. Neither approach does justice
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to the unique blend of creativity and functionality present in most programs—even, however attenuated, in object—coded form—and
neither recognizes that copyright already allows complete functional
duplication of interoperability-related “systems,” “procedures,” or
“methods of operation.” Under the analysis set forth in Altai, the
concept of merger has a useful contribution to make to the analysis of
functional similarities.309 However, merger is simply a tool for
ensuring that copyright does not inadvertently shield expression that
has assumed de facto functionality. As to whether others may practice
a system, method, or series of procedures for achieving interoperability
embodied in a copyrighted computer program, there should be no
doubt; those aspects of the program simply are not part of what the
author's copyright protects.
IV. ENDGAME: PATENT PROTECTION FOR
LOCK-OUT PROGRAMS
Properly understood, copyright does not bar reverse engineering of
lock-out routines and the programs they protect, nor does it bar the
development of functional analogues to those lock-out routines and
other interoperability-related features. As Atari demonstrates, however,
in the real world that may be irrelevant. Under the doctrine of
equivalents, a reverse engineered product that substantially duplicates
the functions performed by a patented lock-out program infringes the
patent.310 On its face, Atari stands for the proposition that a patented
lock-out program provides ironclad protection for the computer system
in which it is incorporated. What Atari did not consider is whether
such a patent can—or should—be valid.311
Answering those questions in any meaningful way requires consideration of both the theoretical and institutional underpinnings of
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the patent system. Doctrinally, the federal courts have failed to develop
a workable rule for distinguishing patentable from unpatentable
computer programs. Institutionally, the Patent and Trademark Office
(“PTO”), which functions as the initial gatekeeper and presumptive
expert on questions of patentability, has proved ineffective at discharging its statutory mandate where computer programs are concerned. Together, these systemic failures undermine the presumption
of validity that attaches to a duly approved patent, and on which the
Atari court relied.312 Judged against a more rigorous standard of patentability by a more demanding gatekeeper, the 10NES might well
have been found undeserving of patent protection. Such a standard has
been proposed, but so far has received little scholarly or judicial
attention. The example of the 10NES patent makes a persuasive case
for its adoption, and for changes in the organization and operation of
the PTO to respond to the unique challenges posed by computer program-related inventions.
A. A PROFUSION OF SLIPPERY SLOPES: THE FAILURE OF EFFORTS
TO ISOLATE PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER
While copyright scholars and computer programmers were debating whether computer programs constituted copyrightable subject
matter and whether CONTU had struck the right balance for protecting
them, an equally vigorous debate focused on the question whether
computer programs satisfied the requirements for patentable subject
matter.313 Over the past two decades, resistance to software patents by
the PTO and the courts has all but vanished. Thousands of software
patents have been issued and are routinely upheld.314 Within the
scientific, business, and academic communities, however, the debate
over whether computer programs are or should be statutory subject
matter continues.315 Regrettably, there is no indication that this debate
informed the parties or the court in Atari.
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As provided in section 101 of the Patent Act, any new and useful
process or machine is potentially patentable subject matter.316 On its
face, this provision encompasses computer programs. However, longstanding judicially developed doctrines prohibit patent protection for
mathematical formulae and mental processes, on the ground that
“processes” that simply describe existing natural laws (whether as basic as 2 + 2 = 4 or as complex as e = mc 2) or recite steps performable
by the human mind do not fall within the category of “useful arts” and
are not statutory subject matter.317 Some commentators have argued
that many computer programs are simply mathematical formulae or
mental processes made concrete.318 Others have argued that the
“machine-like” nature of computer programs brings them squarely
within the class of potentially patentable inventions.319 A principled
basis for evaluating whether computer program-related claims recite
statutory subject matter has proved elusive.
1. From Freeman-Walter-Abele to Alappat: The Corruption of the
“Otherwise Statutory Process or Apparatus” Standard
Although the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (“CCPA”)
decided a number of cases dealing with computer program-related applications in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the history of the current
approach begins with Gottschalk v. Benson.320 In that case, the
Supreme Court rejected under section 101 an attempt to patent a
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computerized process for converting binary-coded numerals to pure
binary form, on the grounds that the patent covered no more than a
mathematical formula, and if granted would preempt its use.321 Six
years later, in Parker v. Flook,322 the Court rejected for similar reasons
an attempt to claim patentability for a computerized method for
continuously recalculating the “alarm limit” during a chemical
conversion process.323 Nonetheless, in both cases the Court stopped
conspicuously short of precluding patentability for all computer
programs.324 The Benson Court indicated that it was concerned less
with patentability per se than with the potentially preemptive reach of
claims based on “mathematical algorithms.”325 Ultimately, the Court
made good on its implicit guarantee that a sufficiently narrow patent
would be upheld. In Diamond v. Diehr,326 it held that a process for
continuously monitoring the temperature inside a synthetic rubber
mold, using a computer and the well-known Arrhenius equation for
measuring cure time as a function of temperature and other variables,
was patentable subject matter. Central to the Court's decision was that
the inventor did not claim all rights to future uses of the Arrhenius
equation, but only to the particular application that he had invented in
the context of an “otherwise statutory” industrial process.327
In the wake of the Supreme Court's decisions in Benson, Flook,
and Diehr, the CCPA and its successor, the Federal Circuit, elaborated a two-part test for assessing the patentability of computer program-related inventions under section 101. Known as the FreemanWalter-Abele test, after the three cases from which it emerged,328 the
test first asked whether the invention directly or indirectly recited a
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mathematical algorithm.329 If so, it directed the court to inquire
whether the claimed invention was no more than the algorithm itself,
or whether instead the algorithm was applied as part of an otherwise
statutory process or apparatus claim. 330 If the former, patent protection
should be denied.331 In theory, this test appeared to provide a means for
limiting patent protection to advances within the “useful arts.”332 In
practice, the Federal Circuit's decisions under Freeman Walter-Abele
strongly suggested that that court had little interest in recognizing any
meaningful limitation on the patentability of computer program-related
inventions. A trio of decisions issued in 1994 has confirmed just that.
These decisions establish that the “otherwise statutory process or
apparatus” requirement may be satisfied by the simple expedient of
drafting claims to include a general purpose computer or standard
hardware or memory element that would be necessary for any useful
application of the algorithm.333 As explained below, that course of
action ignores constitutional limitations that separate patentable
inventions from public domain science, and so threatens the continuing
vitality of the patent system.334
As developed by the PTO and the Federal Circuit prior to 1994, the
“otherwise statutory process or apparatus” limitation of Freeman Walter-Abele was not much of a limit at all. Nearly any physical element or step would suffice to render statutory a claim that recited a
mathematical or “mental process” algorithm. That held true even if the
physical element or step was well-known or an industry standard, and
the mathematical algorithm was the heart of the invention. As a result,
although the rule was designed to satisfy the Benson Court's concerns
about algorithm preemption, it was incapable of doing so.
The case that best exemplified this problem was In re Iwahashi,335
which concerned a system for voice pattern recognition. Broadly
speaking, the claim in Iwahashi recited a novel pattern recognition
algorithm and “a read only memory” (“ROM”) device as elements of a
claimed apparatus.336 For the Federal Circuit, the presence of the
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ROM was sufficient to qualify the claimed invention as a statutory
“machine” or “manufacture.”337 As has been elegantly demonstrated,
however, the ROM limitation is meaningless because a ROM is a basic
component found in all general purpose computers and is necessary
whenever complex calculations involving lookup tables, such as the
calculation required by the Iwahashi algorithm, are performed.338 The
real innovation claimed in Iwahashi was the new pattern recognition
algorithm. By upholding the patent, the court effectively preempted its
use—exactly the result it maintained was avoided by the ROM
limitation.339
Iwahashi was not an aberration. Subsequently, in Arrhythmia Research Technology v. Corazonix Corp.,340 the Federal Circuit upheld a
patent for a computerized method of analyzing electrocardiograph
(“ECG”) patterns to detect persons at risk for certain heart diseases.
The Arrhythmia patent also clearly preempts the algorithm it contains.
The Federal Circuit's opinion briefly raised its application of the
“otherwise statutory process or apparatus” limitation to the level of the
absurd.
Although the invention claimed in Arrhythmia had a number of
steps, those can be grouped into three stages. First, it converted the
analog signals obtained using the ECG into digital signals. It then
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interrelated means and we cannot discern any logical reason why it should not be
deemed statutory subject matter as either a machine or a manufacture as specified in
' 101. 'The fact that the apparatus operates according to an algorithm does not make
it nonstatutory.
Id. at 1375.
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1989), 1112 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 16 (Mar. 13, 1990). For discussion of the PTO's initial
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33 F.3d 126 (Fed. Cir. 1994), discussed infra at text accompanying notes 346-53, indicate that
a spark of resistance remained. However, the new guidelines recently proposed for evaluating
software patents represent the PTO's unconditional surrender. See 60 Fed. Reg. 28,778 (June
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applied a well-known digital filtration technique to analyze the wave
characteristics of the digitized ECG data. Finally, it performed additional mathematical analysis of the filtered ECG data to identify particular patterns and values, using a new mathematical model.341 In
holding the invention statutory, the court reasoned: “These claimed
steps of ‘converting,’ ‘applying,’ ‘determining,’ and ‘comparing’ are
physical process steps that transform one physical, electrical signal into
another.”342 But the conversion of analog signals to digital ones is a
well-known process, as is the operation of a digital computer to
transform one set of digital signals into another.343 And if digital-todigital transformation of electrical signals constitutes a physical limitation sufficient to establish otherwise statutory subject matter, then any
computer-driven algorithm is statutory subject matter anyway, and no
additional “otherwise statutory process or apparatus” need be shown.
More recently, the Federal Circuit has clarified that it did not mean to
go that far, and that the signals must correspond to some underlying
physical steps.344 According to the court, the manipulation of ECG
output counts as such a physical process.345 Nevertheless, in Arrhythmia, as in Iwahashi, the real innovation was not any physical process
or structure, but the mathematical model developed by the inventor for
predicting heart failures based on ECG patterns. The discovery that
certain naturally occurring ECG patterns are correlated with a
likelihood of later heart failure is not something that the patent system
can protect.
Finally, in In re Alappat,346 decided by the en banc court in July
1994 after more than a year of deliberation, the Federal Circuit unambiguously held that a claim for the use of general purpose computing
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Id at 1059.
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Nonetheless, Professor Oddi argues that regarding analog-to-digital or digital-todigital transformation as a sufficient Auseful arts@ limitation is consistent with the Supreme
Court's definition of patentable subject matter, in a non-computer-program-related case, as
Aanything under the sun that is made by man.@ Oddi, supra note 16, at 415-16 (quoting
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 305, 309 (1980)). Even so, because both analog-to-digital
and digital-to-digital transformations are well-known prior art, the mere idea of computerizing
a particular task, whether analog or digital input is required, cannot satisfy the threshold
requirements that a patented invention be novel and nonobvious as well as manmade. See infra
part IV.B.
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and in Trovato, for a method for calculating the shortest, or Aleast cost,@ path between two
points, were disallowed.
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342

1159
equipment to perform a mathematical operation recites a patentable
apparatus—namely, “a combination of known electronic circuitry elements to produce a specific new result.”347 Accordingly, the court
ruled, it need not even perform the two-part inquiry required by the
Freeman-Walter-Abele line of cases.348 The PTO had rejected Alappat’s claims, which covered a process known as a “rasterizer,” developed for controlling the illumination of pixels on a computer screen to
minimize discontinuity and jaggedness.349 The PTO concluded that the
applicant's claims were broad “process” claims that stated a mathematical algorithm for pixel control, and would preempt it.350 In an
opinion by Judge Rich, the author of Iwahashi and the court's leading
advocate of an expansive approach to computer program patentability,
a majority of the Federal Circuit reversed. Citing Iwahashi, the court
held that even though the claims were in process form, the application
“unquestionably” claimed a machine because it referred to circuitry
elements.351 Regarding the objection that those elements—used for
performing mathematical calculations—would be present in any
general purpose computing system, the court observed that “a general
purpose computer in effect becomes a special purpose computer once it
is programmed to perform particular functions pursuant to instructions
from program software.”352 In effect, then, Alappat establishes that a
mathematical algorithm becomes patentable subject matter merely by
virtue of its being programmed into a general purpose computer.
The Alappat court paid lip service to the concerns about preemption of the “laws of nature” and “abstract ideas” stated by the Supreme
Court in Benson and Diehr,353 but went on to reach a result that
ignored those concerns entirely. The Federal Circuit's first significant
post-Alappat decisions, In re Warmerdam354 and In re Lowry,355
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illustrate just how facile the court's conception of the “otherwise statutory apparatus” requirement has become. The court rejected the
claims in the Warmerdam patent that were drafted as process claims,
on the ground that they recited no more than a mathematical algorithm,356 but allowed the claims that were drafted to recite “a
machine having a memory which contains data…generated by” the
same algorithm described in the process claims.357 Together with
Alappat, Warmerdam teaches that if otherwise unpatentable computer
program-related claims are drafted in specific apparatus form, the
mathematical algorithm limitation will simply disappear.358
Lowry involved claims for a method of storing and managing data
in a computer memory. The PTO had rejected the claims under the
“printed matter” doctrine, on the ground that the claims merely recited
the arrangement of data and did not define a new functional
relationship between the data and the computer memory that served as
the substrate.359 The Federal Circuit held that “[t]he printed matter
cases have no factual relevance where ‘the invention as defined by the
claims requires that the information be processed not by the mind but
by a machine, the computer.’ ”360 The court reasoned that electronically specified data hierarchies “impart a physical organization on the
information stored in the memory.”361 Technically, the “printed matter” rejection was based on section 103 of the Patent Act, which requires that an invention be nonobvious, and not on section 101.362 (As
to section 101, the PTO found, and the court agreed without discussion, that a computer memory was a statutory “article of manufacture.”363) However, a section 103 “printed matter” rejection bears
close affinity to a “mental steps” rejection under section 101. In both
cases, the objection to patentability is that the claimed invention does
not contribute to the “useful arts,” but simply restates human thought
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processes.364 In the context of computer program-related inventions,
the question in both cases is whether the program steps merely mimic
those processes. The Federal Circuit’s decision categorically rejects
any such implication. After Lowry, an algorithm for data arrangement,
expressed digitally, is patentable as long as (per Warmerdam) a
memory device is specified.
The Atari court did not subject the issued 10NES patent to the
then-applicable Freeman-Walter-Abele test. Had it done so, the outcome is a foregone conclusion, and affords yet another illustration of
just how nominal the physical limitation required under Freeman-Walter-Abele (and Alappat) need be to satisfy current standards for statutory subject matter. Each of the 10NES claims, in essence, recites a
mathematical algorithm for the synchronous generation of initial
numbers, followed by mathematical comparison of the results of arithmetic operations performed on those numbers. The first claim recites
the following physical limitations: “a main data processor unit for executing a videographics software program” (a video game console); “a
main data processor unit for storing the videographics software program” (a video game cartridge); “a first authenticating processor device”; “a second authenticating processor device”; and a reset
switch.365 The description of the inventor's preferred embodiment
makes clear that the first and second “authenticating processor devices” are microprocessors, or computer chips.366 Just as it is “difficult
to imagine” any complex system for pattern recognition that does not
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See Lowry, 32 F.3d at 1582-83, Samuelson, Benson Revisited, supra note 3, at 103341, 1106-07 (describing the Amental steps@ doctrine and the CCPA’s eventual repudiation of it
as a tool for evaluating computer program-related claims).
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In full the first claim of the IONES patent reads as follows:
A system for determining whether a videographics software program is authorized
for use in an information processing apparatus, comprising:
a main data processor unit for executing a videographics software program;
an external memory for storing the videographics software program and for removable connection to said main processor unit, said external memory and main
processor unit together constituting the information processing apparatus for executing the
videographics software program;
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relationship to the execution of said second authenticating program by said second
processor device.
U.S. Patent No. 4,799,635, col. 11, ll. 8-33 (1989).
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incorporate a ROM,367 it is difficult to imagine any computerized lockand-key system for use with a video game cartridge and machine that
does not incorporate microprocessors. In any event, the patent provides
for that eventuality; the specification discusses adaptations of the lockand-key system for floppy disks and magnetic cards, and the claims
cover use of the invention with both digital and analog processing
devices.368
In sum, there is no question that based on the then-applicable
standard for patentability, the 10NES patent reads on statutory subject
matter. Under Alappat, of course, the patent claims an apparatus
because it incorporates general purpose computing equipment. Alappat, Warmerdam, and Lowry signal a new era for computer programrelated patents, in which anything, or virtually anything, goes.369 It is
difficult to imagine a claim that would not pass muster under the
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Stern, supra note 16, at 382.
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After opposing the applications in all three cases, the PTO recently withdrew its opposition to an application that claimed a computer program embodied in a floppy disk. In re
Beauregard, 53 F.3d 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Shortly thereafter, it proposed new guidelines for
the examination of computer program-related patent applications. See 60 Fed. Reg. 28,778
(June 2, 1995). In essence, the proposed guidelines restate the holdings of Alappat (as to
apparatus), Lowry (as to computer memory devices), and Arrhythmia (as to Aotherwise
statutory @ processes). They recite:
(i) A computer or other programmable apparatus whose actions are directed by a
computer program or other form of Asoftware@ is a statutory @machine.@
(ii) A computer-readable memory [defined to include compact discs and floppy
disks] that can be used to direct a computer to function in a particular manner when
used by the computer is a statutory Aarticle of manufacture.@
(iii) A series of specific operational steps to be performed on or with the aid of a
computer is a statutory Aprocess.@
Id. at 28,778-79 (endnote omitted); see id. at 28,780 (endnote defining computer-readable
memory to include compact discs and floppy disks). The proposed guidelines exclude data
structures “independent of any physical element,@ id. at 28,779, but this limitation is less a
restriction on patentability than a reminder of the importance of proper claim drafting. Also
excluded are Aprocess[es] that do [ ] nothing more than manipulate abstract ideas or
concepts….” Id. In light of Arrhythmia's holding that the manipulation of ECG signals
corresponded to physical steps, however, this language excludes only the most facially abstract
claims. See supra text accompanying notes 341-45. Moreover, the proposed guidelines make
clear that even an algorithm for manipulating abstract concepts may be saved by the recitation
of Acomputer implemented steps.” 60 Fed. Reg. at 28,780. The PTO cautions that in some
cases “a claim classified as a statutory machine or article of manufacture may define
nonstatutory subject matter,” but notes that these situations will be “rare.” Id at 28,779.) In
short, the proposed guidelines, like the Federal Circuit case law that they follow, fail to provide
a meaningful rule for excluding nonstatutory claims.
It is worth noting that the PTO views its actions as a response to Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), and other recent cases (discussed in Part III, supra)
that have restricted the scope of copyright protection for computer programs. SeeJames Evans,
Patent Office Works on New Rules for Software Protection, S.F. DAILY J., April 6, 1995, at 6
(“ ‘We are focused on how best to serve our customers, and our customers are sending us the
message that they need more protection for compute r-related inventions.’ ” (quoting PTO
solicitor Nancy Linck)). Current PTO Commissioner Bruce Lehman, a former lawyer and
lobbyist for Lotus, is presumably well-acquainted with the issues raised in the Borland
litigation. See Teresa Riordan, Controversial Pick for Patent Chief: Clinton's Selection Called
‘Political Debt,’ S.F. CHRON ., May 8,1993, at A16. Nonetheless, the scope of copyright
protection for computer programs is not within the PTO's purview, and the trend toward Athin@
copyright protection for nonliteral program aspects cannot, standing alone, constitute
justification for changes in the PTO's position on the proper patent treatment of computer
programs. Nor may the PTO interpret the patent laws solely to satisfy its Acustomers.@
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“nominal hardware” standard.370 However, there is something terribly
wrong with a system of decisionmaking that routinely produces exactly
the result it claims to prohibit—the result that its highest court has
stated would vitiate the purpose of the patent regime. Unfortunately,
alternative proposed frameworks for assessing whether computer
program-related inventions constitute statutory subject matter are
equally unpromising.
2. Rethinking the Mathematical Algorithm Bar
One proposed solution, of course, is to abandon the mathematical
algorithm bar altogether on the ground that a mathematical algorithm
in digital form constitutes a process like any other, and so is statutory
subject matter under the literal language of the Patent Act. Along with
Judge Rich of the Federal Circuit, Professor Chisum has long been a
leading advocate of this approach. 371 In effect, Arrhythmia, Alappat,
Warmerdam, and Lowry reach this result, while giving only the barest
nod to the Supreme Court's clear intent to preserve some limitations on
patentability.
Certainly, classifying all computer programs as
statutory subject matter eligible for patent protection would greatly
simplify the process of evaluating computer program-related patent
applications.
However, abandoning the rule against preemption of
mathematical formulae would violate the fundamental requirement
that patents be granted only for the application of scientific
principles, not for their development—that is, not for equations, calculations, or formulations of natural laws.372 The resulting ease of administration would come at too great a social cost; ultimately, it would
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Stern, supra note 16, at 392-93. The patent bar has been quick to respond to the Federal Circuit's move away from Benson and Flook. See, e.g., David S. Benyacar, Mathematical
Algorithm Patentability: Understanding the Confusion, 19 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J.
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celebrated law that E=mc2; nor could Newton have patented the law of gravity. Such
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frustrate the patent system’s constitutionally mandated goal of inducing progress in the useful arts.
If mathematical algorithms are statutory subject matter, patents
may issue for computer programs that simply execute complex calculations and are not tied to any “industrial” process. It may be argued
that a computer program is not a mathematical formula at all, but an
improved process for executing one.373 In the digital age, however, a
rule premised on a distinction between mathematics and process is
facile. Complex physical and mathematical discoveries, such as
Mandelbrot's theory of fractals or Lorenz' theory of chaos, often see
their first and only expression in digital form. To perform the required
calculations by hand would take decades, even centuries. The
distinction between silicon and paper is too slim a reed on which to
hang satisfaction of the statutory subject matter requirement.374
The requirement that mathematical formulae be excluded from
patentability, moreover, is of constitutional stature. The Constitution
authorizes Congress to grant “inventors” the exclusive right to their
“discoveries” in order “[t]o promote the [p]rogress of…the useful
[a]rts. 375 Granting exclusive rights to mathematical formulae merely
because they have been expressed in digital form would have the opposite effect. That fundamental mathematical, chemical, and physical
principles may be termed “discoveries” is of no moment.376 A crucial
premise of the patent system is that such principles remain in the public domain for future inventors to use.377 Thus, the patent laws may
protect novel and useful applications of those principles, but not the
373

See Chisum, supra note 16, at 1006.
The argument that computerized algorithms are merely expressions that “approximate”
laws of nature, see Donner & Beckers, supra note 319, is unpersuasive, for it begs the question
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principles themselves. If a mathematical discovery expressed digitally
is transmuted into a patentable process, more and more formerly unpatentable discoveries will be removed from the public domain for the
statutory seventeen-year term. According patent protection to computerized mathematical algorithms in this indiscriminate fashion would
vitiate the terms of the constitutional grant.
The world would be a very different place if Einstein had received a patent on his discovery that e = mc 2, or if Millikan or
Schrödinger had patented their pathbreaking work in electromagnetism
and particle physics, or if any of them had been required to license the
principles they used along the way.378 The truly patentable inventions
that these pioneering discoveries enabled might never have occurred,
and certainly would have occurred more slowly, if those discoveries
had not been freely available.379
Under a regime that makes
distinctions between mathematical formulae based on the mode in
which they are expressed, the future of research and development in
this country may strongly resemble that world. While a robust public
sector might still preserve a core of public domain science, ours may
not be up to that task. Even nominally public research is increasingly
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Erwin Schrödinger developed a wave equation for describing quantum mechanics and
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privatized; joint ventures, faculty consultancies, and technology transfer agreements abound.380 The Balkanization of scientific knowledge
into competing accretions of proprietary rights will greatly weaken existing incentives to inventors.381
But to except only mathematical algorithms and their equivalents,
such as the formal expression of a chemical reaction, from section
101's ambit is to return to the original problem: how to distinguish
those computer program-related inventions that are “no more than”
mathematical algorithms from those that are properly within the useful
arts. The rejection of Professor Chisum's solution only underscores that
dilemma.
3. An “Information Processing” Exclusion
Professor Samuelson’s proposed solution to the problem of when
to treat computer program-related inventions as statutory subject
matter is the opposite of Professor Chisum’s. She argues that both the
mathematical algorithm and mental process doctrines are directed at
“information processing,” rather than at the “industrial arts,” and accordingly proposes excluding information processing-related developments—including, it would appear, all computer programs—from the
ambit of the Patent Act.382
An “information processing” limitation on patentability is problematic for two reasons. First, some information processing developments, such as pioneering advances in data compression technology or
color reproduction, are true, qualitative departures from the prior art.383
Denying
patent protection to those inventions would weaken
incentives for development, and so would err too greatly on the side
of underprotection, confirming the fears of Judge Rich, Professor
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Chisum, and others who maintain that restricting the patentability of
computer program-related inventions will bring about the demise of
the patent system as we know it.384 Computer technology is, broadly
speaking, a “useful art,”385 and innovations of appropriate stature
should be rewarded, and thereby encouraged, to the same degree as
innovations in other fields. Whether the balance of incentives that
results from the current overinclusive approach to all computer
program-related developments is a healthy one is a separate
question.386
Second, and ultimately far more important, to the extent that an
“information processing” exclusion would preclude protection for all
computer programs, it would shortly render the patent system obsolete.
As the flood of software patents issued in recent years demonstrates,
industrial processes of all sorts are increasingly computerized.387 Once
the commands required to execute such processes are expressed
digitally, each such process has a built-in “information processing”
component. If inventions are to be considered “as a whole,” as
Freeman-Walter-Abele and Alappat require,388 then no patents may be
issued for any of those inventions. And if inventions are not to be
considered as whole, how are we to determine which computer
program-related inventions are not properly considered information
processing devices? The question whether a claimed invention reads
on an information processing device merely restates the question
whether the claims recite, in essence, no more than a mathematical
algorithm, and brings us no closer to answering it. In short, Professor
Samuelson's answer to Professor Chisum takes us out of the frying pan
and into the fire. While under Professor Chisum's solution to the
mathematical algorithm dilemma the patent system would consume the
public domain, under Professor Samuelson's the public domain (or a
sui generis scheme of quasi-patent protection for information
processing inventions) would consume the patent system.
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4. Claim Construction and the Particularity Requirement
Since Iwahashi, some commentators have suggested that the debate over when computer programs constitute statutory subject matter
under section 101 is better understood, and more precisely resolved, as
a debate over the particularity requirement imposed by section 112 of
the Patent Act.389 Among other things, section 112 requires that the
patent describe with particularity—and thereby limit—the claimed
invention.390 Adherents of the section 112 approach argue that the
particularity requirement serves as a built-in safeguard against
preemption of a particular formula, equation, or sequence of digital
steps.391
The security afforded against algorithm preemption by section 112
is illusory, because, as demonstrated above, there is no assurance that
the limitation proposed by the inventor and accepted by the PTO will
be a meaningful one, and no guarantee for applicants that rejections for
lack of particularity will be made in a consistent manner. Iwahashi,
Arrhythmia, Alappat, Warmerdam, Lowry, and Atari all involved very
particularized, precise claims. In none was overbreadth a function of
vagueness; instead, it arose from the attempt to cast items of general
purpose computing equipment as meaningful physical limitations. The
inescapable conclusion is that while section 112 prevents the patentee
from precluding all uses of a formula claimed as part of an invention, it
does not prevent it from precluding all meaningful or practicable
uses.392 Thus, the particularity requirement cannot solve the statutory
subject matter problem.
B. POINT OF NOVELTY RECONCEIVED :
THE INNOVATIVE PROGRAMMER STANDARD
The absence of a principled basis under section 101 of the Patent
Act for separating statutory inventions from claimed inventions that
are “no more than” nonstatutory mathematical algorithms is disturbing.
However, the intense focus on statutory subject matter ignores the
existence of other statutory requirements for patentability. In
particular, the requirements set forth in sections 102 and 103 of the
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Patent Act, that a claimed invention be novel and nonobvious to those
ordinarily skilled in the field,393 may be used to accomplish what the
statutory subject matter inquiry cannot achieve: a rule that permits
analytic dissection of claims into statutory and nonstatutory elements
for purposes of identifying which computer program-related inventions
are patentable.
Intuitively, the most troubling aspect of many computer programrelated patents is that they appear to reward the inventor for recognizing the obvious—that a given function may be performed more efficiently or more accurately if computerized—and using general purpose
computer equipment and standard programming techniques to
computerize it. Other computer program-related patents simply reward
the programmer for developing otherwise unpatentable mathematical
formulas. In that sense, the objections to the lwahashi, Arrhythmia, and
Alappat patents, like the objection to the Lowry patent, are really based
on obviousness and lack of novelty. In each case, the new and
nonobvious element was not the physical apparatus, which was wellknown and widely used, but rather the otherwise unpatentable
mathematical algorithm developed to analyze the data and compute the
desired output.394
In response to Iwahashi, Richard Stern, former chief of the Department of Justice's Intellectual Property Section, proposed reconceiving the standard for nonobviousness for computer programrelated
inventions. His solution, which may be termed the “innovative
programmer” standard, adds a third step to the Freeman-Walter-Abele
test. If a claimed invention recites a mathematical algorithm, but
appears to be statutory subject matter when taken as a whole, the
examiner must ask whether the claimed invention would have been
obvious to “a person of ordinary skill…who: (a) knew the particular
algorithm; (b) desired to accomplish the function or task to be performed; and (c) desired to do so with the aid of a computer….”395 If
not, it is nonobvious, and so patentable. By taking general purpose
computer equipment and the mathematical algorithm as part of the
prior art for purposes of assessing nonobviousness, the innovative
programmer standard is intended to avoid the pitfalls described in Part
IV.A, above.
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The innovative programmer standard is similar to an approach
known as the “point of novelty” test, which has been disfavored by the
courts. That treatment was ill-considered. The point of novelty test
offered a logically and doctrinally viable method for assessing the patentability of computer program-related inventions. The innovative
programmer standard improves upon it, by tailoring the test to the
unique nature of computer software.
The point of novelty approach first surfaced in the early days of
computer programming. As set forth in In re Abrams,396 it involved
analytic dissection of the claimed invention to determine whether its
novelty resided in its physical elements or in “one or more of the socalled mental steps.397 However, the court then confused the section
102 requirement of novelty with the section 101 requirement of statutory subject matter. It held that if the novelty of the claimed invention
resided in “mental steps,” the claimed invention was not statutory
subject matter.398 In Application of Musgrave 399 Judge Rich rejected
the Abrams approach as based on a logical fallacy. He reasoned:
[I]f [Abrams] were the law, a given process…could be statutory during
the infancy of the field of technology to which it pertained, when the
physical steps were new, and non-statutory at some later time after the
physical steps became old, acquiring prior art status, which would be an
absurd result. Logically, the identical process cannot be first within and
later without the categories of statutory subject matter, depending on
400
such extraneous factors.

The Musgrave court concluded that because an invention cannot be
considered statutory subject matter only at certain points in time, each
claimed invention must be assessed as a whole for purposes of the
inquiry required by section 101.401
Eight years after its rejection by the CCPA, the Abrams point of
novelty analysis resurfaced in the Supreme Court's opinion in Parker v.
Flook.402 Without citing either Abrams or Musgrave, the Court observed that “the proper analysis for this case” was that “[t]he process
itself, not merely the mathematical algorithm, must be new and useful.
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Indeed the novelty of the mathematical algorithm is not a determining
factor at all…. [I]t is treated as though it were a familiar part of the
prior art.”403 The Court then went on to duplicate the fallacy of
Abrams, however. It ruled that if the novelty of the claimed invention
resided in the mathematical algorithm, then the claimed process could
not constitute statutory subject matter under section 101.404 In fact,
properly stated, the ill-fated Abrams/Flook test for patentable subject
matter turns entirely upon a novelty and nonobviousness analysis. A
slight reformulation of the test avoids Judge Rich's objection: A
claimed invention that, taken as a whole, is (or may be) statutory subject matter is nonetheless unpatentable if its novelty and nonobviousness inheres in its nonstatutory elements. This reformulated test is
similar to the innovative programmer standard proposed by Stern in
that both would require the examiner to separate the mathematical
algorithm from the other elements of the claimed invention when
conducting the separate inquiry into novelty and nonobviousness.405
In Diamond v. Diehr,406 the Court recognized its error of logic.
Adopting the CCPA rule, it held unambiguously that “ ‘novelty’…is of
no relevance in determining whether the subject matter of a claim falls
within the § 101 categories of possibly patentable subject matter,” and
that the claim “must be considered as a whole” for that determination.407 After Diehr, then, it is undisputed that a claimed invention
may not be dissected into its component parts for purposes of the statutory subject matter inquiry. However, the Court also rejected the
Flook point of novelty analysis on independent grounds. It opined that
a rule requiring that mathematical algorithms be considered part of the
prior art “would, if carried to its extreme, make all inventions
unpatentable because all inventions can be reduced to underlying
principles of nature which, once known, make their implementation

403

Id. at 591-92.
Id. at 594. This reasoning was sharply criticized by the CCPA, thinly disguised as a
criticism of the brief of the party that suggested it. In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 962-63
(C.C.P.A.), vacated sub nom. Diamond v. Bergy, 444 U.S. 1028 (1980); see also David A.
Blumenthal & Bruce D. Riter, Statutory or Nonstatutory?: An Analysis of the Patentability of
Computer Related Inventions, 62 J. PAT . & TRADEMARK OF F . SOC 'Y 454, 484-87 (1980)
(criticizing confusion of section 101 and section 103 requirements in Flook).
405
Cf. Alan P. Klein, Reinventing the Examination Process for Patent Applications
Covering Software-Related Inventions, 13 JOHN M ARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO . L. 231
(1995) (proposing that new mathematical algorithms be deemed abandoned into the prior art
under ' 102(c) because they cannot be claimed separately as inventions in their own right).
406
450 U.S. 175 (1981).
407
Id. at 188-89.
404

1172
obvious.”408 Although this analysis has received some critical support,409 it is in its own way as ill-considered as Flook’s confusion regarding section 101.
As Professor Burk has noted, the Diehr Court's reasoning has its
roots in Justice Frankfurter's concurrence in Funk Bros. Seed Co. v.
Kalo Inoculant Co.410 The Funk Bros. Court disallowed a patent for a
mixed culture of naturally occurring bacteria on the ground that it
claimed a preexisting phenomenon of nature411; Justice Frankfurter
objected that a “ ‘laws of nature’” rationale “could fairly be employed
to challenge almost every patent.”412 The Diehr Court was also
influenced by its recent decision in Diamond v. Chakrabarty,413 which
established the patentability of laboratory-grown bacteria. Together,
Chakrabarly and Diehr might be read to establish that the touchstone
for patentability must be the simple test of whether the claimed invention is “manmade,” and that the invention must be evaluated as a
whole for all purposes. In fact, there is no logical reason that analytic
dissection may not be employed during the inquiry into novelty and
nonobviousness required under sections 102 and 103 of the Patent Act.
To the contrary, such an analytic approach is a necessary part of the
process of evaluating any claimed invention against existing prior art.
The real question, dismissed in Diehr with a reference to “extreme[s],”
is whether the patent laws forbid examiners and courts from dissecting
out newly discovered scientific and mathematical principles. Because,
as I have discussed, the patent laws cannot reward new and nonobvious
advances in mathematics, the answer must be yes.414
Given the difficulties that attend any effort to separate unpatentable
principles from their patentable applications, the Court's “slippery
slope” argument is unpersuasive. As the “otherwise statutory process
or apparatus” rule developed in Freeman-Walter-Abele illustrates,415
a rule requiring isolation and exclusion of unpatentable elements
is not the only approach to patentability that poses a danger of
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overbreadth. When carried to its extreme, as it has been by the Federal
Circuit, the “otherwise statutory” rule can be applied to render any
process that contains computer components patentable. Arguably, the
danger of reduction to “phenomena of nature” is particularly acute in
the case of biological inventions, which may too frequently be viewed
as black boxes that produce results based on their (naturally
determined) biochemical properties, even when those results did not
formerly exist in nature.416 Even so, however, generalizing that danger
to all inventions is unwarranted. Although it is certainly possible to
analyze computer program-related inventions in a way that reduces
them to bedrock principles of conductivity and electromagnetism,
computer programs as a class, unlike bacteria or proteins, do not exist
in nature in any form. Rather, they are a wholly human-made class of
articles that employ mathematical principles to accomplish results.
Thus, although in the abstract the boundary between mathematical
principle and application defies precise articulation,417 it should be
possible to separate the two in particular cases.
Ironically, Diehr is a case in point. The mathematical equation used
in the rubber-curing process at issue in Diehr was the well-known
Arrhenius equation.418 The fact that the mathematical formula was “a
familiar part of the prior art”419 did not preclude the Court from finding
the claimed application of the formula to be new and nonobvious, even
as it rejected that test. Of course, isolating the mathematical formula
component of a claim is not always so easy; if it were, the controversy
over computer program-related patents would not exist. The advantage
of a point of novelty approach over the “otherwise statutory process or
apparatus” formulation developed in Freeman-Walter-Abele is that,
unfettered by section 101's requirement that the claimed invention be
taken as a whole, it allows courts and examiners to dissect principles
and mathematical proofs, which are not patentable, from their
applications, which may be, and determine where the inventive act lies
and whether it is the kind of inventive act the patent system can
reward.

416

Professor Burk=s support for Diehr=s rejection of Flook is based on this reasoning.
Burk, supra note 409, at 26-33, 42-43.
417
For one view on where that boundary lies, see Irah H. Donner, Two Decades of Gottschalk v. Benson: Putting the “Rithm@ Back Into the Patenting of Mathematical Algorithms, 5
SO F T W A R E L.J. 418, 448-59 (1992). But see Newell, supra note 315, at 1024-38 (arguing that
in computer science, no such boundary exists).
418
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 177 (1981). See supra text accompanying note 327.
419
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 592 (1978).

1174
The innovative programmer standard differs from the reformulated
Abrams/Flook test, however, in that it adds general purpose computing
equipment to the list of givens.420 As the analysis in Part IV.A
demonstrates, that recommendation is sound and its adoption long
overdue. A mathematical principle expressed digitally, though not
patentable, may be new; general purpose computing equipment is not
even that. We are fast approaching an era in which any industrial
function can be directed by a general purpose computer with the appropriate software. As with any other useful art, the patent laws should
reward only genuinely new and nonobvious advances in the
application of computer technology, not the comparatively mundane,
though complex, process of adapting a general purpose computer to a
particular use with existing programming techniques.
In light of Diehr and the Federal Circuit's aggressive stance on
software patentability, it is perhaps not surprising that the innovative
programmer standard has drawn little response. For those who believe
that any mathematical algorithm expressed digitally is a patentable
process—or, with a “nominal hardware” or memory limitation, a
patentable apparatus or article of manufacture—a standard designed to
narrow the rule and close the floodgates will not constitute much of an
improvement. However, the innovative programmer standard should
satisfy those who concede that computerized mathematical formulae
are unpatentable, but worry that there is no reliable means of
identifying which claimed inventions fall into that category. The standard offers a doctrinally sound basis for dissecting out those elements
of a claimed invention that alone cannot properly be considered patentable, either because they are public domain building blocks available to all, or because the idea of using them would be obvious to
anyone conversant with computers. Decisions about whether the invention is sufficiently novel and nonobvious to qualify for patentability
can then be made based on what the dissection reveals.
Under the innovative programmer standard, the patents at issue in
Iwahashi, Arrhythmia, Alappat, Warmerdam, Lowry, and Atari might
never have been granted. Atari is illustrative. Take away the two
microprocessors and the reset switch that constitute the “nominal
hardware” and all that remains is a specification for a series of mathematical functions. Take those functions as part of the prior art and all
that remains is the relatively mundane task of assembling the physical

420

Stern, supra note 16, at 395.

1175
building blocks of the lock-and-key system. The question the examiner
should have asked was whether the combination of those physical
elements would have been obvious to any ordinarily skilled programmer who wished to devise an effective lock-out device.421 Because I
am not an ordinarily skilled programmer, I do not attempt to answer
that question. Instead, the next section examines the remaining factors
that would bear on whether the examiner reached the correct answer.
C. INSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCE
Developing a workable and doctrinally sound approach to assessing the patentability of computer program-related inventions is only
half the battle. Because decisions on patentability are inherently fact
specific, the technical competence of the decisionmaker—the PTO—is
critical in determining whether the rules governing patentability will be
applied correctly. Technical competence alone cannot cure the lack of
a coherent standard, but it can significantly narrow the margin of error
and reduce the number of erroneously granted patents. In the years
since Diehr opened the floodgates to computer program-related claims,
the PTO has failed in that respect because it lacked both the personnel
and the resources to evaluate such claims for technical merit and to
make informed judgments regarding nonobviousness. In response to
the howls of criticism that followed the issuance of a patent covering a
standard industry method of multimedia data retrieval,422 the PTO has
set in motion several organizational and procedural changes designed
to address its shortcomings. Those changes, though important, do not
go far enough.
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1. The Decisionmakers
In theory, the patent examination process consists of a rigorous
analysis of the claimed invention by an examiner trained in the same
scientific field. Until 1994, however, the PTO's list of accepted technical backgrounds for patent examiners did not include computer science, and the PTO did not hire computer scientists as examiners or
technical staff members.423 It is impossible to overstate the consequences of that policy, or lack of it, for the overprotection of computer
program-related developments. A duly examined and approved patent
is presumed valid.424 To overcome this presumption in subsequent
infringement litigation, a challenger must present clear and convincing
evidence of some error by the patent examiner.425 This standard is a
high one, often prohibitively so. Because I patent examination requires
technical competence that most judges do not possess, judges are
reluctant to second-guess an examiner's decision. As a matter of logic,
however, the presumption of validity is justified only if the examiner's
qualifications warrant it.
Computer program-related applications are particularly difficult to
evaluate because they may require knowledge of two different fields—
computer science and some other field, such as chemistry or medicine,
in which the invention is intended for use.
For example, an
application for an improved method of processing and interpreting
seismic waves to detect the presence of fossil fuel deposits would be
assigned to Class 367, for “Communications, Electrical: Acoustic
Wave Systems and Devices,” while the application for an improved
method of analyzing electrocardiograph readings to predict and treat
heart disease, at issue in Arrhythmia, was assigned to Class 128, for
“Surgery.”426 What both inventions have in common, however, is that
they are based in part on computer applications—applications that
neither the examiner trained as a geologist nor the examiner trained in
the biological sciences is equipped to evaluate. Moreover, the prospecting application might rely in part on programming techniques
originally developed in a different industrial context altogether, such
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as chemistry or metallurgy. Yet the examiner trained in geology assigned to examine the prospecting patent would have no particular
knowledge of patents recently granted in those fields.
In 1994 the PTO revised its hiring criteria to include computer
science among the accepted technical backgrounds and, in mid-1994,
hired nine individuals with computer science degrees to assist the examiner corps.427 Although this is an important step in the right direction, the PTO will not be fully equipped to handle computer programrelated claims until computer scientists have been accorded examiner
status and can veto applications that are insufficiently novel or nonobvious to merit patent protection. Where appropriate, each such application should be assigned two examiners, one to evaluate the claimed
invention with respect to the intended field of use and one to evaluate
it with respect to the state of the computer science-related prior art; the
approval of both should be required before a patent may issue. As to all
computer program-related patents issued before the addition of the new
computer science personnel to the PTO's technical staff, courts
deciding issues of patent validity should discount the presumption of
validity, and give greater weight to expert testimony offered by the
parties.
2. Prior Art
The determination whether a claimed invention is novel and nonobvious is based on examination of relevant prior art in the applicable
technical field. The applicant must cite prior art that bears on the
claimed invention as part of the patent application, and the examiner
also must look beyond what is cited before granting the patent.428 The
presumption of validity that applies to an issued patent is based not
only on the examiner's technical qualifications, but also on the examiner's search of the prior art. Once again, that presumption is only as
good as the resources that support it.
Within the last decade, many glaring defects relating to the organization and accessibility of the PTO's collection of prior art have been
remedied. The PTO's database of issued patents has been automated,
and examiners have access to commercially available on-line
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databases as well. 429 However, in the field of computers and computer
programs, much that qualifies as prior art lies outside the areas in
which the PTO traditionally has looked—previously issued patents and
previous scholarly publications. Many new developments in computer
programming are not documented in scholarly publications at all.
Some are simply incorporated into products and placed on the market;
others are discussed only in textbooks or user manuals that are not
available to examiners on line.430 In an area that relies so heavily on
published, “official” prior art, a rejection based on “common industry
knowledge” that does not appear in the scholarly literature is
unlikely.431 Particularly where the examiner lacks a computer science
background, highly relevant prior art may simply be missed. In the
case of the multimedia data retrieval patent granted to Compton's New
Media, industry criticism prompted the PTO to reexamine the patent
and ultimately to reject it because it did not represent a novel and
nonobvious advance over existing technology.432 However, it would be
inefficient, and probably impracticable, to reexamine every computer
program-related patent, and the PTO is unlikely to do so.
Even when an examiner overlooks relevant prior art, the patent
remains clothed in the presumption of validity. An accused infringer
may offer the missed prior art to show invalidity, but the court must
find the evidence of invalidity clear and convincing.433 In Atari, that
hurdle proved too high. A missed piece of prior art relating to a
computer reset switch was a central element of Atari's defense against
Nintendo's patent infringement claims.434
Judge Smith declined to
grant summary judgment in favor of Atari on the invalidity issue. After examining the reset reference, the district judge ruled that she
could not conclude as a matter of law that Nintendo's application of
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the reset feature would have been obvious to a programmer of ordinary
skill.435 Subsequently, the jury also rejected Atari's invalidity argument. Absent the presumption of validity, the outcome could well
have been different at either procedural stage.
Before the PTO can evaluate computer program-related applications competently, its database of relevant prior art must be made
complete. Thus far, however, the PTO has taken no steps to do this. In
response to the PTO's inaction, the Software Patent Institute in Ann
Arbor, Michigan has begun assembling “a database of computer
science folklore—techniques that are in use, but not widely published.”436 As conceived, the database also will include computer science textbooks and computer program-related magazine items.437 If
realized, such a database might constitute a significant step toward
eliminating the prior art problem, but only if the PTO uses it on a
regular basis. A more reliable alternative would be to place a database
of computer program-related prior art within the PTO's control and
require that it be used. Much of the raw material for such a database
already is present in the archives of the Copyright Office and the
Library of Congress. Every computer science textbook and computer
system manual in which copyright is claimed must be deposited with
the Copyright Office as part of the copyright registration process, and
textbooks published with notice of copyright are deposited with the
Library of Congress.438 Under regulations adopted pursuant to the 1976
amendments to the Copyright Act, every computer program that is the
subject of a copyright registration also is deposited, at least in partial
form, with the Copyright Office, and every computer program
“published” with notice of copyright is deposited with the Library of
Congress.439 It would be a relatively simple matter to amend the
copyright and patent statutes to require that a separate copy of every
computer program, every piece of supporting documentation, and
every computer-related textbook or magazine deposited with the
Copyright Office or the Library of Congress also be filed with the
PTO. Accessing the knowledge contained in this prior art then would
be a matter of hiring individuals with the requisite specialized knowledge to index and maintain the collection.
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3. Shifting the Burden of Production
In 1994, after the Compton’s New Media debacle, the PTO supported an additional change in its examination procedures that reflected a newfound lack of confidence in its ability to examine
computer program-related patent applications. The Patent Term and
Publication Reform Act, submitted to Congress but not enacted in
1994, would have required that patent applications be disclosed to the
public eighteen months after the patent application is filed.440 Interested parties could then bring relevant prior art not contained in the
PTO's database to the examiner's attention. A bill to require publication
after eighteen months has been reintroduced in the 104th Congress,441
as well as another bill that would afford third parties increased
opportunities for participation in patent reexamination proceedings.442
Both amendments would, in effect, shift the burden back to the
computer industry, the PTO's most vocal critic, to police itself.
Ironically, the strongest opposition to publication at eighteen
months may come from inventors themselves, who risk losing trade
secret protection for their products if their patent applications are denied.443 It might be argued that the disclosure provisions would deter
inventors from seeking patent protection, with the result that many
valuable, patentable inventions would be kept from the public. This is
a valid argument against the amendment only if the applicants turned
away are worthy, however, and there is no empirical evidence to suggest that this would be the case. Absent such evidence, it is at least as
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likely that the current system of nondisclosure encourages applications
of dubious merit, submitted on the off chance that a patent will issue. If
a patent is denied, the innovation can still be held as a trade secret.
Under a system that subjects each application to public scrutiny, the
applicants who weed themselves out may well be the undeserving
ones. Weakening the incentives to seek patent protection for computer
programs thus may yield results that are entirely consistent with the
purposes of the Patent Act and the criteria for patentability. The
proposed amendment regarding reexamination, a process that cannot
be triggered until a patent is issued, will not produce a like effect.
However, neither publication of patent applications nor increased
opportunities for reexamination will reduce the need for a qualified,
well-informed examiner corps. Even under a public comment regime,
the examiner assigned to each computer program-related application
must be able to digest and evaluate the significance of materials submitted by interested members of the public, and must make the final
decision as to patentability. The PTO cannot and should not cede that
critical function to the public, particularly where, as a practical matter,
the “public” will be made up largely of opponents of software patents
and the prospective patentee's competitors. Accordingly, enactment of
a provision for publication of patent applications should not foreclose
continued self-examination by the PTO.
V. LOCK-OUT AS MISUSE: TWO PARADOXES
So far, no court has considered the misuse defense as applied to
claims of intellectual property in lock-out programs. Misuse defenses
were raised in Sega and Atari, but were not litigated in either case.444
In the context of lock-out, the concept of misuse is singularly apt.
From the copyright perspective, lock-out programs are creative works
devised to bar others from utilizing ideas and functional principles that
the Copyright Act does not protect.
From the patent perspective,
they are (or may be) novel and nonobvious inventions that operate to
bar access to and use of unpatented computer systems and public domain principles and ideas. In each case, however, application of the
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Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 1392, 1399 (N.D. Cal.), affd in part
and rev=d in part, 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992), as amended, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 78 (9th
Cir. 1993). See supra note 56 (discussing misuse and antitrust allegations in Atari). In Sega, of
course, there was no need to reach the issue of Sega's alleged misuse. Atari's misuse defenses
were severed for later trial with Atari's antitrust claims against Nintendo, and the case settled
before that second phase could occur. See supra text accompanying notes 73-75.
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misuse defense results in a paradox. In the case of patent, the misuse
doctrine as applied to lock-out threatens to nullify the patentee’s intellectual property right. In the case of copyright, if functional duplication is permissible, as Part III argues, the copier who takes only
functionality does not infringe, and the copier who takes too much—
who duplicates protected expression in addition to unprotectable
functionality—can never complain of misuse. One result seems too
harsh; the other, not harsh enough. This part explores those results and
the rules that produce them.
Part V.A addresses the application of the doctrine of patent misuse
to a lock-out patent such as the 10NES. It first considers—and
rejects—the suggestion that patents such as the 10NES simply should
be disallowed for failure to satisfy the Patent Act's requirement of
usefulness.445 It then addresses the reach of the patent misuse doc trine
in the lock-out context and argues that the doctrine should be
narrowed, but not abandoned altogether in favor of an antitrust approach, as some have suggested.446 Part V.B addresses the more intractable difficulties posed by application of the misuse doctrine to
attempted enforcement of a copyright in a lock-out program. It argues
that despite the exclusionary intent behind a copyrighted lockout
program, denominating as misuse conduct that simply makes it more
difficult for competitors to achieve interoperability would be inconsistent with the purposes of copyright protection.
A. THE PATENT MISUSE DEFENSE AND
THE ENFORCEABILITY DILEMMA
The patent misuse doctrine affords an equitable defense to certain
claims of patent infringement.447
As articulated by the Supreme
Court, the doctrine prohibits any attempt by the patentee to extend
the lawful monopoly conferred on it by the patent laws to an area
outside the scope of the patent.448 Thus, Nintendo's use of the 10NES
patent against Atari appears to present the most straightforward case
of misuse imaginable. Nintendo's patent monopoly extended only to
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See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, The Economic Irrationality of the Patent Misuse Doctrine,
78 CAL . L. REV . 1599 (1990) [hereinafter Lemley, Economic Irrationality]; see also Note,
Clarifying the Copyright Misuse Defense. The Role of Antitrust Standards and First
Amendment Values, 104 HARV . L. REV . 1289 (1991).
447
See generally 5 CHISUM , supra note 310, ' 19.04 (summarizing the law of patent
misuse).
448
See, e.g., Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942); Motion Picture
Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
446

1183
the lock-out programs embedded in its console and cartridges, not to
the console itself, nor to the console operating system. Manufacturing
the console to include the later-developed lock-out program did not
change that fundamental fact. Accordingly, under the Supreme Court's
formulation of the misuse defense, Nintendo's subsequent use of the
lock-out patent to ensure that only its licensees could gain access to the
console was an unlawful extension of the patent grant.
The arguments against application of the patent misuse defense in
the context of lock-out are twofold. First, statutory restrictions on the
defense limit its reach in that context to patentees with antitrust market
power.449 By definition, however, a computer system manufacturer that
adopts a lock-out regime has such power in the market for programs
compatible with its system. The second argument is one of logic, and
might be made, roughly, as follows: If the patent may not be invoked
against those who gain access to the console using a functional
equivalent of the patented device, it is unenforceable, and the patent
misuse defense may not be construed to render a duly approved patent
unenforceable ex ante. Ultimately, this objection to the misuse defense
fails for two reasons. First, if a patented lock-out device has no use
other than to enlarge the scope of the patent grant, then the device
lacks utility, the patent is invalid, and the question of its enforceability
is moot.450 Second, lock-out devices for computer systems do have
other, legitimate uses.451 However, the argument about enforceability
raises important questions about the contours and practical
consequences of the misuse doctrine in its current form.
1. The Patent Misuse Reform Act of 1988
The installation of a lock-out program in a computer system operates as a tie, by conditioning the initial sale of a system on the subsequent purchase of authorized programs developed by the system
manufacturer or its licensees.452 Thus, for example, installation of the
10NES tied the market for NES-compatible games, formerly open to
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anyone who could design a game with commercial appeal, to the
market for NES consoles.453 Under the patent misuse doctrine as originally formulated by the Supreme Court, any use of a patented item as
the tying product constituted misuse per se.454 However, the Patent
Misuse Reform Act of 1988 narrowed the scope of the patent misuse
defense as applied to tying arrangements.455 Under the resulting section 271(d)(5) of the Patent Act, tying does not constitute a misuse
unless “in view of the circumstances” the patentee has market power in
the market for the tying product—here, the computer system or video
game console.456
Analysis of the misuse ramifications of lockout
programs must begin with consideration of the extent to which section
271(d)(5) precludes or limits assertion of the misuse defense against
the computer system manufacturers that install them.
The crucial question in the market power inquiry is, of course, the
definition of the relevant market. In Eastman Kodak v. Image Technical Services,457 the Supreme Court approved, at least in principle, the
use of a single-product definition of the tying product market when the
tied product market is derivative of the tying product market.458 The
first question, then, is whether the market for games or programs that
are interoperable with a particular system is distinct from the market
for that system, making it efficient to provide the two products
separately. 459 The existence of independent game developers and the
fact that multiple game programs may be purchased separately from
the game console demonstrate the existence of distinct, separate markets. Whether a computer system manufacturer that installs lock-out
programs has market power in the market for interoperable programs
depends on the extent to which the initial system purchase locks the
consumer in and precludes or militates against a later decision to
switch systems.460 Here the answer is less straightforward. Although
the number, variety, and cost of available programs for different systems will change over time in a manner that consumers may not foresee, the cost of switching consoles—or even of owning two different
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ones—is significantly lower than the cost at issue in Kodak, that of
switching photocopiers.461
Even though “lock-in” costs may be less significant for computer
systems, however, the unique manner in which the tie-in is accomplished constitutes a factor that “in view of the circumstances”462
should lead courts inexorably to the conclusion that the market power
requirement is met. The tying effect achieved by the adoption of a
lock-out regime is devastatingly absolute.463 The coercion required to
show tying is not contractual and subject to negotiation, but rather
physical and incontrovertible. A lock-out program does not merely
restrict competitors’ ability to make and sell interoperable programs
and consumers’ ability to obtain them, but confers, instantly, an absolute right to exclude competitors from making, using, or, selling the
tied product at all. 464 And yet the patented program itself—the focus of
the misuse defense, and the real tying product—is completely unnecessary to the intended function and use of the de facto tying product, the computer system.
Neither the text nor the legislative history of the Reform Act
suggests that it was intended to shield a patentee's efforts to control the
derivative market of an unpatented commodity by the simple expedient of manufacturing that commodity to include a supernumerary patented device.
And no legitimate business reason exists for the
adoption of a lock-out regime designed to control the market for programs compatible with an unpatented computer system. A system
manufacturer concerned with quality control has other avenues of
legal recourse.465 Accordingly, the manufacturer of a proprietary but
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unpatented computer system who installs a lock-out program that effectively ties the market for compatible programs to the system market
should be deemed to satisfy the market power requirement.466
2. Lock-Out Patents and the Usefulness Requirement
To be patentable, an invention must be “useful” as well as novel
and nonobvious.467 Compared to the other two statutory requirements
for patentability, the usefulness requirement has received relatively
little attention, for obvious reasons. Most inventions have self-evident
uses. Ordinarily, inventions are developed with an intended use in
mind, and that use is disclosed as part of the patent application.468 The
10NES patent is no exception; it was developed to provide lock-andkey functionality for a video game console, and the patent so
states.469However, the usefulness requirement also includes a public
policy element: The intended use may not be contrary to law.470 If the
intended and only use of the 10NES violates the public policy behind
the Patent Act, then the 10NES arguably lacks utility.
As originally conceived, the public policy underlying the usefulness requirement was directed at inventions deemed “frivolous or injurious to the well-being, good policy, or sound morals of society.”471
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The other theory of antitrust liability advanced in the interoperability context is monopolization of an essential facility. See, e.g., Jeff Barge, High-Tech Firms Face Scrutiny,
A.B.A. J. July 1994, at 36, 37. Application of the essential facility doctrine in the context of
lock-out is problematic, however, because its combination with a Kodak-type market power
analysis is inherently circular. A variant on the classic essential facility fact pattern illustrates
this circularity. Instead of a river with one bridge over it, see United States v. Terminal R.R.
Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912), imagine three bridges. One, operated by the Nintendo Bridge
Company, is a railroad trestle. Another, owned by the Sega Bridge Corporation, carries truck
traffic. The third, operated by an upstart competitor of Nintendo and Sega called 3DO, is a
monorail bridge. Once a freight company needing to transport goods across the river has
purchased or leased its desired modes of transportation, the costs of switching are high. Under
Kodak, each company has market power in the market for traffic over its bridge, but it does not
follow that any one company’s bridge is an essential facility for crossing the river. Arguably,
anyone denied access to the bridge of his or her choice can simply switch modes of
transportation. If all three bridge proprietors deny access, there is no principled basis, other
than assessment of each proprietor's market power in the larger market for traffic across the
river, for deciding whose bridge is truly “essential.”
467
35 U.S.C. '101.
468
See 35 U.S.C. '112 (requiring disclosure of “the manner and process of making and
using [the invention] Y [and] the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out [the]
invention”).
469
U.S. Patent No. 4,799,635, abstract, p. 1 (1989).
470
See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 673 F. Supp. 1278, 1325 (D. Del.
1987).
471
Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817); see generally ICHISUM, supra
note 310, ' 4.03[l] (discussing public policy aspect of utility requirement).

1187
During the first part of the twentieth century, several patents on devices for gambling or “games of chance” were invalidated on morality
based grounds.472 Gradually, however, courts retreated from a morality-based approach. At first, courts simply held that an otherwise immoral invention would satisfy the usefulness requirement if it had the
capacity for beneficial use .473 More recently, although current formulations of the public policy exception to the usefulness requirement
retain “immorality” as a basis for rejecting a patent, courts considering
utility-based challenges to patents have suggested that the public
policy exception will be invoked only to reject patents covering devices whose use violates the law.474 As a result, the scope of the modern public policy exception is extremely narrow. In the last fifty years,
there is no reported case denying patent protection on public policy
grounds.
Obviously, lock-out programs do not raise questions of immorality.
Instead, lock-out programs test the reach of the public policy exception's illegality prong. Assuming, still, that a lock-out program such
as the 10NES has no use other than to enlarge the scope of the patent
grant by excluding competitors from creating and marketing programs
for an unpatented computer system, its “usefulness” turns on whether
triggering an equitable defense to an infringement claim is sufficient to
establish illegality. Lock-out programs are not illegal in the formal
sense. No law forbids their development or use, nor does their use
violate any criminal law, in the way that use of a gambling machine
violated nineteenth-century laws against gambling. The public policy
underlying the Patent Act is violated only if the lock-out patent is
enforced.475 And even then, what is violated is not a provision of the
Patent Act, but a judicially created, highly fact-specific, equitable
rule.476 Militating against a finding of usefulness, however, is the fact
that the public policy in question is not based on moralistic notions of
correct behavior, but rather on the legislative purpose embodied in a
federal statute.
Ultimately, however, we need not resolve the question whether
lock-out programs are illegal, and so nonuseful, because enforcement
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of a lock-out patent violates patent policy. Lock-out programs such as
the 10NES also have the potential for lawful—that is, non-misuse—
use. Accordingly, by analogy to the “beneficial use” rule developed in
the turn-of-the-century gambling cases,477 they are “useful” within the
meaning of the Patent Act.
Consider four scenarios. The first, which I shall call scenario A,
involves the Atari fact pattern, minus Atari's fraud on the Copyright
Office.478 Nintendo installs a lock-out program in its video game system, the NES, and Atari reverse engineers the device so that it can
market NES-compatible game cartridges. Nintendo then sues Atari for
patent infringement. In scenario B, the Rip-Off Company (“ROC”), an
offshore computer company, copies Nintendo's games and imports the
counterfeits into the United States for distribution. When ROC begins
distributing counterfeit Nintendo games that incorporate the 10NES
lock-and-key technology, Nintendo files suit for patent infringement.
In scenario C, Nintendo decides to diversify its business portfolio. It
begins marketing an office computer system (the “NOS”) that
incorporates a lock-out device designed to restrict access to the system
to those holding authorized access cards. Hacker, Inc. reverse
engineers the device so that it can break into the secure system or, for a
fee, enable others to do so, and Nintendo sues Hacker. In the final
scenario, scenario D, a manufacturer of IBM-compatible clones installs
a lock-out program in its computers to enable their use as a secure
office system.
In scenario B, the lock-out program is employed, at least ostensibly, to make software counterfeiting more difficult—an indisputably
lawful purpose.479 When the 10NES is copied, the patent provides
Nintendo with another remedy against ROC, in addition to any copyright, trademark, or unfair competition claims that Nintendo chooses to
assert. As in scenario A, enforcement of the patent in scenario B
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results in a type of exclusion. However, the excluded party in scenario
B is in a poor position to invoke equity, because it has simply appropriated Nintendo's intellectual property—Nintendo's game programs
and the 10NES program—for its own use.480 In this context,
Nintendo's use of the patent to identify and pursue ROC for software
piracy constitutes an appropriate, though elaborate, strategy for protecting its intellectual property rights.481
The use of the 10NES technology suggested in scenarios C and D
also is lawful. Although, technically speaking, the lock-out device installed in the NOS achieves the same result as that installed in the
NES, the consequences for the purchaser of the system are very different. In scenario A, installation of a lock-out device in the NES results
in fewer NES-compatible games available for purchase. In scenarios C
and D, lock-out is precisely the result desired by purchasers of the
system, whether it is the proprietary NOS or the adapted clone, to
protect the security of information stored there. Nor does the use of
lock-out technology in the NOS exclude competitors in the absolute
sense, since it does not affect the market for interoperable software that
can be installed on the system, and also leaves room for competitors to
design and market their own secure systems to other customers. Put
differently, in scenarios C and D, the lock-out program targets alien
users, not alien programs, and thus does not effect an unlawful
expansion of the patentee's intellectual property rights.
It may be argued that the possibility of scenarios C and D does
not save the 10NES patent, because the claims asserted in the patent
were limited to a device for authenticating “a videographics
software program.”482 The Nintendo patent contributes to the goal
of the Patent Clause to advance knowledge in the “useful arts,” but the
advancement of knowledge alone will not support a patent grant.483
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Thus, scenarios C and D constitute an argument for the utility of lockout programs in general, not the 10NES in particular. However, under
the “capacity for lawful use” standard advanced here, the possibility of
scenario B is enough to establish the 10NES’ usefulness, or at least to
incline courts to address that question on a case-by-case basis. Thus,
we turn once again to the doctrine of misuse.
3. Lock-Out as Patent Misuse
The conclusion that lock-out programs have lawful uses, and so
need not fail the public policy test for usefulness, also answers the
argument that holding Nintendo's enforcement of its patent against
Atari to be a misuse would nullify the 10NES patent. Quite clearly, it
would not. The preceding section has identified at least three non-Atari
contexts in which a lock-out patent might be enforced. Unfortunately,
that does not entirely solve the first of our two misuse paradoxes. As a
practical matter, application of the misuse doctrine in Atari might in
fact have barred any subsequent enforcement of the 10NES patent.
That result is not unique to lock-out, however; it is a function of the
current formulation of the patent misuse defense.
Consider again scenarios A and B. If Nintendo sues ROC, as in
scenario B, it can enforce the 10NES patent; if Nintendo sues Atari, as
in scenario A, it cannot. However, if the factual predicate for scenario
A exists, Nintendo cannot enforce its patent against ROC, either. A
finding of patent misuse bars the patentee from enforcing its patent
against anyone, even a clear infringer who otherwise could raise no
defense to the infringement claim.484 Under this approach to the patent
misuse doctrine, the core principle underlying the doctrine is one of
reciprocal obligation. When a patent is issued, the patentee's promise
that it will not abuse the limited monopoly granted it is an implied quid
pro quo.485 A misuse of the patent constitutes voluntary divestiture by
the patentee of its right to invoke the protection of the patent laws until
the misuse is purged and its consequences “fully dissipated.”486
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ROC, meanwhile, has received a windfall. It has defeated
Nintendo's infringement claim even though Nintendo committed no
misuse of the patent with respect to ROC. There is no requirement of
standing to invoke the patent misuse defense.487 Accordingly, ROC
may invoke the defense to its own benefit, whether or not it has been
injured by Nintendo's use of the 10NES. A corollary to the absence of
a standing requirement is that there need not be even rough parity
between the remedy—complete and unconditional nonenforcement of
the patent—and the injury suffered by the infringer as a result of the
patentee's attempt to extend its grant. Thus, for example, in scenario B,
ROC benefits even though its injury is nil.
For these reasons and others,488 Professor Lemley has suggested
that the patent misuse defense should require an antitrust analysis.
Antitrust principles, it is claimed, more precisely match the remedy
afforded by law to the harm done, both to the accused infringer and to
society generally.489 As argued in Part V.A.1, system manufacturers
who install lock-out programs to exclude competitors from unpatented
computer systems should be deemed to satisfy the Patent Misuse
Reform Act's requirement of antitrust market power. However,
whether or not installation of the 10NES to prevent competitors from
developing NES-compatible games constitutes an antitrust violation,
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antitrust law does not afford an appropriate foundation for the doctrine
of patent misuse, although courts may find certain antitrust principles
useful in defining its scope.
It has been argued that the particular economic model adopted by
the antitrust laws is uniquely ill-suited to evaluate the intellectual
property system, because the antitrust laws focus exclusively on shortterm, price-based competition among essentially fungible products.490
The intellectual property laws take a longer-term view, focusing on
competition through innovation.491 One consequence of this difference
in emphasis is that, despite their vaunted capacity to measure the harms
done to competition and mete out the appropriate quanta of redress, the
antitrust laws may not view as cognizable certain harms to the
innovative process that flow from misuse of a grant of patent or
copyright protection. For example, an attempt to enforce a lock-out
patent against a legitimate software developer is, in essence, an attempt
to preclude, or at least control, continuing innovation in a particular
type of computer technology.492 Such conduct need not drive up
consumer prices—indeed, the intellectual property owner may use
license royalty rates to keep its prices low, out of recognition that low
prices heighten existing barriers to entry by restricting a new entrant's
ability to recoup its research and development costs.
Even more fundamentally, the antitrust laws delineate the permissible bounds of private use of private property. Generally speaking,
one may conduct a private enterprise for private gain until the point at
which the public's interest in competition is injured. A patent or
copyright, in contrast, implicates the public from the outset, and not
only because the limited monopoly accorded is a public grant.
Through doctrines such as fair use, the “idea-expression” distinction,
and the rule against patent protection for natural laws and mathematical formulae, the public is given rights that overlap the boundaries of
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the copyright or patent even before the term of the grant has expired.493
The specialized doctrines of patent and copyright misuse are better
tailored to maintain the correct balance of public and private
interests.494
In short, the overbreadth of the patent misuse doctrine as currently
formulated does not justify abandoning the concept of patent misuse
altogether. Both economically and normatively speaking, the patent
misuse doctrine serves important purposes that the antitrust laws do
not. However, the expansive “abuse-it-and-lose-it” approach to the
patent misuse doctrine, which rewards “true” infringers and penalizes
the patentee for far more than its unlawful conduct, seems overly
harsh. Given that the application of patent and copyright principles to
computer programs is often uncertain, and millions of dollars can turn
on the answers, misuse as to one class of alleged infringers should not
cost the patentee its rights as to others. In the copyright context, several
courts have required that would-be beneficiaries of a misuse defense
show some nexus between their infringement and the copyright
owner's inequitable conduct.495 Courts considering patent misuse
defenses should do the same.496
The real problem with application of the patent misuse
defense in the context of lock-out is one that the antitrust laws do not
address. If enforcement of a lock-out patent against would-be creators
of interoperable software constitutes misuse, such legitimate
competitors need not expend the effort to develop their own functional
equivalents of the lock-out program. They can simply copy the patented program, with the only barrier being the difficulty of copying.
Courts are thus faced with a new dilemma. Use of the lock-out program to exclude those seeking to create interoperable software impermissibly extends the scope of the grant, but allowing copying destroys
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the patentee's incentive to develop new technological solutions. However, the disincentive that results from literal copying is not one that
the patent misuse doctrine can address, because the patent laws do not
protect literal code, but only the product or process it embodies.497 As a
practical matter, although the patent misuse defense may be available
to some literal copiers, it will avail only the competitor who infringes
by equivalent. A competitor who copies the literal code of a lock-out
device will be liable for copyright infringement.498
B. THIN COPYRIGHTS AND THE CONTRACTION
OF THE COPYRIGHT MISUSE DEFENSE
When the focus of the misuse inquiry shifts from patent to copyright, the outcome is radically different. If copyright allows a competitor like Atari to duplicate all of the functional features of a
copyrighted lock-out program, as I have argued it does,499 it appears
that there is no conduct left for the copyright misuse defense to
reach. 500 If Atari takes only such expression as is necessary to
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allow it to duplicate interoperability-related processes and routines,
there is no infringement. If Atari takes creative expression as well,
Nintendo’s assertion of its copyright to protest the qualitative difference in Atari’s copying is not a misuse.501 This section considers
whether this contraction of the copyright misuse defense is justified in
view of lock-out's exclusionary purpose, and, if so, whether the doctrine of copyright misuse retains any independent force in lock-out
cases.
A lock-out program is, in a sense, a creative work designed to
frustrate the production of other creative works. Lock-out programs are
specifically designed to make copying and reverse engineering as
difficult as possible.502 The installation of a lock-out program in a
computer system constitutes an attempt by the copyright owner to dictate who may create works based on a particular set of functional
principles and who may not. Nintendo and Sega used their devices to
control the number and selection of video games interoperable with
their consoles503; in the future, the manufacturer of the “set-top box”
that serves as my gateway to the “information superhighway” might
use a lock-out program to control the number and selection of on-line
services that I may access from my living room. Arguably, allowing
any enforcement of copyright in a lock-out program against would-be
creators of interoperable programs offends core principles of copyright
by preventing or reducing the likelihood of the development and
dissemination of new creative works. Under this view, such enforcement would constitute misuse per se, even if the competitor has taken
creative expression.
From the programmer's perspective, however, the difficulty of reverse engineering a lock-out program is one measure of its creativity.
According copyright protection to a newer and more ingenious lock-

501
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out program rewards and encourages this creative effort.504 A misuse
allegation by an inartful reverse engineer thus pits two fundamental
copyright principles—the rule against monopoly of functional principles505 and the incentive structure for encouraging the production and
distribution of new creative works—squarely against one another.
Ultimately, allowing the difficulty of reverse engineering to justify
a finding of misuse would beg the question why the difficulties
inherent in reverse engineering an operating system should be treated
differently. Reverse engineering an operating system, or any other
computer program distributed in object code, is difficult.506
A lockout program simply builds in another layer of programming that a
reverse engineer must decipher, and another sequence whose function
must be duplicated while avoiding substantial similarity to protected
matter in the original.
Moreover, given the short market life of many
computer programs, increasing the difficulty of reverse engineering
arguably promotes the purposes of copyright. Lock-out routines that
are difficult to reverse engineer increase the copyright owner's lead
time over would-be developers of interoperable products. The freedom
to develop difficult lock-out routines thus increases the likelihood
that the copyright owner will be able to recoup its initial
investment before competing products developed through reverse engineering enter the market.507 Accordingly, the added difficulty of reverse engineering a lock-out program is not something that the
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copyright law should recognize as a ground for a finding of misuse.
Such a rule would have a chilling effect on the innovation that the law
seeks to encourage. The Copyright Act may shelter the reverse engineer's efforts, but it does not forbid the copyright owner from making
those efforts more difficult.
If the reverse engineer who takes protected expression in the course
of duplicating unprotectable functionality may not argue difficulty as
grounds for invoking the copyright misuse defense, what becomes of
the copyright misuse defense in interoperability-related cases?
Although the right to duplicate functional features of copyrighted
computer programs significantly narrows the scope of the defense, it
does not eliminate it entirely. Would-be creators of interoperable
programs who choose to license the lock-out technology rather than
reverse engineer it may be able to invoke the copyright misuse defense
to challenge the console manufacturer's license agreement.508 The fact
that a reverse engineering option is available should not justify the
imposition of contractual terms that amount to copyright misuse on
software developers who, for whatever reason, choose not to avail
themselves of the reverse engineering process.
It has been argued that the license restrictions in Atari and Sega
actually furthered the distribution of creative works by enabling
Nintendo and Sega to charge lower prices for their consoles, which in
turn enabled more consumers to buy them. Under this theory, such
licenses serve as variable-proportion tying arrangements that further
the purpose of copyright by promoting overall “product diffusion.”509
Economically, that argument rests on the dubious assumption that
courts should look to the total number of games distributed, rather than
the number of different games available, in making that determination.
The two measures are neither equivalent nor fungible, and maximizing
the former number will not necessarily maximize the latter.510 To
the contrary, the licensing policies adopted by Sega and Nintendo
impose a ceiling on the number of different games that will be
approved for manufacture, and thus effect a decrease in the variety of
games that would otherwise be available for purchase. Moreover, it
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strains credulity to argue that the purposes of copyright are served by a
system that allows the console manufacturer to use its control over the
uncopyrightable functional principles on which the console operates to
dictate which creative works may be developed and distributed, and
who may develop them. License agreements that restrict the
development of interoperable products in the purported interest of
product diffusion do not automatically or necessarily further the
purposes of copyright, and should be scrutinized carefully to ensure
that they do not have the opposite effect.
VI. CONCLUSION: REFLECTIONS ON THE MODELS
FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION OF
COMPUTER PROGRAMS
Where does this exploration of the intellectual property issues
surrounding lock-out programs leave us? As I indicated at the outset, I
believe that it enables a systematic and concrete assessment of whether
copyright and patent protection for computer programs, as currently
understood and applied, serves the purpose of “promot[ing] the
progress of science and the useful [a]rts.”511 Those questions are
important because they affect the competitive structure of an entire
industry, and, ultimately, each of us as consumers, whether of home
entertainment systems, “set-top boxes,” or some other product yet to be
conceived. If closed proprietary platforms and lock-out programs
become more common, competition and innovation cannot continue to
thrive without systematic rethinking of the way that intellectual
property protection for computer programs is conceived and enforced.
As this Article has explained, a computer program, such as the
10NES, that satisfies the PTO's standard for novelty is currently protected under both patent and copyright law—that is, both as a useful
invention and as a creative work. That result was largely fortuitous; the
debates over copyright and patent protection for computer software,
though roughly contemporaneous, were conducted by separate groups.
The result was dual protection for computer programs, with virtually
no attention paid to the potential consequences of the overlap.512
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It has been argued that the overlap between patent and copyright
protection for computer programs represents “a failure of consideration
for the original patent grant” or “a form of ‘double patenting,’ ”
because the protection afforded by copyright extends beyond the term
of the patent.513 That is true only if, as in Atari, copyright and patent
are construed to protect the same program features. There is no reason
that an individual cannot be both inventor and author, and that a
computer program cannot constitute both a useful invention and a
creative work. However, both designations cannot apply to the same
element, and in particular, copyright protection cannot be invoked to
bar duplication of functional program features that are protectable, if at
all, only under the patent system.514 For the copyright/patent overlap
not to result in an unconstitutional failure of consideration, all
functional program features of a patented computer program must
enter the public domain when the term of the patent expires.515 Put
differently, under the current scheme of intellectual property protection
for computer programs, the overlap between copyright and patent
requires that the respective spheres of protection be clearly defined so
that they are mutually exclusive, and so that neither sphere protects
unpatentable, uncopyrightable ideas or mathematical principles.
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The status of intellectual property protection for computer programs is shifting. In computer copyright cases, the trend is increasingly
toward recognizing that copyright affords only “thin” protection.516 In
contrast, although some structural changes are underway at the PTO
that will affect the initial processing of computer program-related
applications, the Federal Circuit commitment to an expansive approach
to patentability has grown more entrenched. Among commentators and
legal scholars, the past decade has seen a groundswell of criticism for
both legal frameworks, but, so far, little consensus on the appropriate
solution. Some favor sui generis protection,517 others advocate a
copyright-based systern, 518 and still others argue that a patent-based
system is preferable.519 From a political perspective, the likelihood of
systemic or paradigmatic change in the mode of intellectual property
protection of computer programs is small, because international
accords regarding the source of protection for computer programs have
taken shape based on the existing copyright and patent models.520 As a
practical matter, then, the options have been narrowed. The question, at
least for the immediate future, is not whether a sui generis scheme of
protection will be adopted, but whether and how to fine-tune the
models we have.
Based on analysis of the interoperability and lock-out problems, I
have attempted to set forth a blueprint for appropriate and desirable
changes. I have argued that computer programs should be identified
within the existing framework of the Copyright Act as a sui generis
category of copyrightable works, and that the fair use doctrine should
be reconceived to include intermediate copying solely to gain knowledge and understanding as a protected, “enabling” use. I have argued,
as well, that section 102(b) functionality, rather than limited and
inapposite doctrines such as scènes à faire or inherently slippery concepts of current and future use, should be the touchstone by which
duplication of nonliteral program elements is evaluated. On the patent
side, I have advocated adoption of an “innovative programmer”
standard for judging the novelty and nonobviousness of computer program-related inventions, to preclude patentability for unprotectable
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mathematical and physical principles implemented via general purpose
computing equipment. Finally, I have recommended that use of a
patented lock-out program to exclude competing software developers
from unpatented computer systems be deemed a misuse of the patent.
Taken together, these changes are designed to ensure that intellectual
property protection for lock-out programs in particular, and computer
programs in general, will not protect what is unprotectable under
copyright law, patent law, or both.
The preliminary report released by the Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights, an arm of the Clinton administration's Information Infrastructure Task Force, sets forth a very different vision of
the future of computer program-related intellectual property rights.521
Among other things, the Working Group has proposed changes to the
copyright laws that would ban and criminalize the manufacture or importation of technology designed to defeat “anti-copying” devices
installed in computer software.522 Unmentioned in the report is the fact
that the proposed changes would effectively eliminate the reverse engineering right recognized by the courts, and so render wholly academic the right to develop interoperable programs that follows from
the language of section 102(b) of the Copyright Act.523 As an initial
matter, if the intellectual property laws are to be changed in a way that
would deprive the public of rights it currently has, that fact should be
admitted. More fundamentally, the Working Group's proposal to make
copyright protection for computer programs virtually ironclad ignores
the role of the patent system and the constitutional significance of the
two-tiered patent/copyright model of protection for intellectual
property rights.
Rarely in the development of any body of law have the lines of
conflict been so clearly and acrimoniously drawn. Fearing the effect on
nuanced, carefully developed bodies of law, some of the leading
copyright and patent scholars have strenuously opposed any changes in
copyright or patent doctrines premised on acknowledgment that
computer programs are different from other covered works. Professor
Miller envisions the gradual erosion of the idea-expression distinction
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as a result of according “thin” copyright protection to computer programs; Professor Chisum and Judge Rich resist the exclusion of obviously artificial “processes” from the class of potentially patentable
works, and foresee the disintegration of patent protection as claims are
parsed ever more narrowly. 524 On the other side of the debate,
opponents of copyright or patent protection for computer programs are
increasingly adamant about the current systems’ inability to adapt to
this particular technological change. One eminent computer scientist,
responding to Professor Chisum’s call for sanity and a return to timehonored first principles of patent law, answered as follows: “The
Models Are Broken!”525
Both sides are right to fear the consequences of expanding intellectual property doctrines to encompass computer programs, but, I
believe, wrong about what will avoid the apocalypse. All models are
by nature imperfect, but (as Sega, Altai, and Flook demonstrate) the
core doctrines governing copyrightability, patentability, and the scope
of copyright and patent protection remain vital and resilient. In order to
avoid doing violence to these basic models, which have proved so
well-suited to the other “sciences” and “useful arts,” new rules and
new exceptions for computer programs must be incorporated into the
models. The law must adjust to accommodate computer programs, so
that the models will not break. As I have argued throughout this Article, the adjustments required are not wrenching, and are themselves
based on fundamental precepts of copyright and patent protection that
require excluding functional principles from the ambit of copyright and
keeping mathematical algorithms in the public domain. The
adjustments suggested are to secondary copyright and patent doctrines
developed to effectuate those purposes. It would be surprising, given
the faith placed in the models by their self-appointed guardians, if the
models were not strong enough to bear the weight of these changes.
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